On 05/05/16 10:57, Rob Stradling wrote:
<snip>
Consider a certificate chain of this form:
Root
Intermediate 1 (contains Name Constraints / EKU)
Intermediate 2 (does not contain Name Constraints / EKU)
End-entity
<snip>
Since Intermediate 2 is effectively technically constrained, you might
imagine that it should be exempt from the disclosure requirement.
However, the "certificate MUST include...extension" language in both the
Mozilla CA Policy and the BRs seems to clearly state that:
- Intermediate 1 need not be disclosed.
- Intermediate 2 MUST be disclosed.
Similarly, consider a certificate chain that is technically constrained
using EKU alone:
Root (with "websites" trust bit enabled)
Intermediate 1 (contains EKU with one OID: id-kp-clientAuth)
Intermediate 2 (does not contain EKU)
End-entity
Again, ISTM that Intermediate 2 MUST be disclosed (as per policy) even
though NSS/Firefox would not trust serverAuth certs issued by it.
(Note: https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures currently classifies
Intermediate 2 as "Technically Constrained (id-kp-serverAuth ∉ EKU", but
I'm wondering if I should change that to match my understanding of the
policy).
--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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