The use of DNS nameConstraints is a useful tool for restricting the scope of 
SSL issuance by external subCAs, and examples exist with hundreds of 
nameConstraints.  However some subCA customers are reporting issues with some 
applications when using subCA certificates that include large numbers of 
nameConstraints.



A subCA customer has proposed the following solution to divide up the 
nameConstraints.  They asked if we could issue them with three subCA 
certificates instead of one.  The proposed solution would include one subCA 
certificate with all the nameConstraints (subCA A) and then two subCA 
certificates with subsets of the nameConstraints (subCA B and subCA C).  The 
subCA certificates B and C would only be used in cases with known problems 
handling large nameConstraints pools.



- All three subCA certs would have the same public keys, Subject DNs and 
Subject Key IDs; and

- The subCAs would be different certs so have different serial numbers, 
thumbprints, and included nameConstraints.



I do not believe that this proposal poses concerns from an audit, security, or 
Mozilla compliance perspective.  However I believe that the proposal may cause 
path building and validation issues for end users' browsers (for example if a 
user first encounters an SSL chained to subCA C and then later visits a site 
chained to subCA B; the certs have the same SKI but different included 
nameConstraints).



The customer believes they can mitigate these support issues by ensuring the 
majority of their users first encounter subCA A which includes all the 
nameConstraints found in subCA B and subCA C.



However, I am interested in feedback from the Mozilla community, including any 
experience on handling subCAs with large numbers of nameConstraints.



Many thanks in advance for any input.

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