See below inline, thanks.



Best Regards,




-----Original Message-----
From: Jeremy Rowley [] 
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 3:50 AM
To: Jeremy Rowley <>; Peter Bowen 
<>; Gervase Markham <>
Cc: Richard Wang <>;
Subject: RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign


Also, I think the biggest concern is the mis issuance issues were not reported 

to Mozilla but were reported to Google. A failure to report a problem in 

domain validation creates a question of whether the CA can be trusted in the 

future.  Could we boil these incidents down to the following concerns?


1) WoSign missued certificates by failing to have adequate security that the 
domain validation could be bypassed using a high level port


R: we are searching if we mis-issued any certificate for this case since Google 
just told us to forbid the higher port, not told us any cert mis-issued.


2) WoSign should provide clarity on whether the issuance of a StartCom and 
WoSign cert through the same portal should be considered a mis-issuance 


R: As we clarified that this port issue is not related StartCom, just the API 
case that we declared, please refer to the previous emails.


3) WoSign was permitting higher level domain verification to enable issuance at 
lower level domains (which is now clearly impermissible)


R: yes, but we fixed this bug.


4) WoSign appears to be backdating certificates to avoid BR compliance and


R: AS I said in the Bugzilla, this is not the case, this is API bug that found 
and used by Computest only for two test certificate, not for any normal case. 
We don’t have old equipment customer to require SHA1 certificate.


5) WoSign failed to report mis-issuance to Mozilla


R: Yes, I agree this is our mistake and never happen again in the future.




-----Original Message-----

From: dev-security-policy


On Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley

Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 1:41 PM

To: Peter Bowen < <>>; Gervase 
Markham < <>>

Cc: Richard Wang < <>>;


Subject: RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign


That's true. I think WoSign should chime in and provide clarity about what

happened. There's far too many innocent explanations to start crying foul.


However, the fact a researcher was able to obtain a cert without proper domain

validation is pretty serious. I'd like to hear more details about how this was

accomplished. Ports 8080 and 8443 aren't that uncommon so penalizing someone

merely for port use seems harsh when there wasn't a policy against it.


-----Original Message-----

From: Peter Bowen [ <>]

Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 10:45 AM

To: Gervase Markham < <>>

Cc: Jeremy Rowley < <>>;

 <>; Richard Wang

< <>>

Subject: Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign


On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 9:30 AM, Gervase Markham < <>> wrote:

> On 24/08/16 17:12, Jeremy Rowley wrote:

>> On incident 2, it sounds like they are both using the same

>> auto-generation script.


> It seems like a bit more than that, doesn't it? Let's presume that

> WoSign did not ship a copy of their intermediate cert's private key to

> StartCom. Therefore, this cert must have been issued on the back end

> by some sort of WoSign system. So either WoSign's back-end issuing

> service has some form of authentication and the StartCom system had

> those credentials (why?), or the WoSign system does not have any form

> of authentication (concerning).


I think you are missing the most likely option: CA hosting.  My understanding

is that it is not uncommon that one CA operator contracts with another CA

operator to run a CA on behalf of the first operator.  I don't think it has

been clear what disclosure of this practice is required.  Given that I believe

this is widespread, I assumed that all of the issuing CAs in this case were

operated by the same entity.




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