Hi everyone! Thank you, Gervase et al., for your excellent work. It is encouraging to see this done so conscientiously and professionally when the circumstances require so. While not claiming any particular significance for my opinion, I do fully agree with the conclusions and the proposed action.
I have one question about the proposal: what is the rationale and justification for the one-year minimum distrust? While this seems quite reasonable at first glance, my thinking is this: clearly, the proposed extensive audit must be deemed sufficient to allow for re-qualification a year from now (because otherwise you would not be proposing it). Then why would such an extensive audit not be sufficient when executed right now? In other words: what does the addition of simply waiting for a year change about admissibility to the Mozilla roots? One possible rationale might of course be to deliver a form of punishment, if only to discourage any future misconduct by other CAs. On the one hand, that would be a delicate thing to do, on the other hand it could be seen as a necessary strategic move to protect the functioning of the trust program (think Game Theory). Thanks –Stefan _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
