I'm not sure exactly what you are asking. These sub CAs are cross-signs with other entities. DigiCert controls the root, but not the issuing CAs. Except for the ones I listed, they are all WebTrust or ETSI audited so we trust them. They are primarily government, large corporations, and other CAs. Most are transferring away from DigiCert or moving to a solution where we host the private keys and certificates. There are some who insist on operating their own root and cross-sign for ubiquity.
-----Original Message----- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert....@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Han Yuwei Sent: Thursday, November 3, 2016 6:14 PM To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: Update on transition of the Verizon roots and issuance of SHA1 certificates 在 2016年11月4日星期五 UTC+8上午3:52:23，Jeremy Rowley写道： > Resent without a signature.... > > > > Hi everyone, > > > > This email is intended to gather public and browser feedback on how we are > handling the transitioning Verizon's customers to DigiCert and share with > everyone the plan for when all non-DigiCert hosted sub CAs will be fully > compliant with the BRs and network security guidelines. Primarily, this > letter addresses when all issuing CAs previously held by Verizon will be > covered by an unqualified audit and how we are responding to the sub CAs that > issued SHA1 certificates. We are looking forward to the browser and public > feedback on how to handle the non-compliant cross-signs and insight on how > the public views our transition progress and planned completion dates. > > > > Background > > Prior to presenting the plan for remediation, I thought I'd share a bit about > our progress with migrating Verizon customers. About a year ago in July, > DigiCert closed an agreement with Verizon where DigiCert took ownership of > three publicly-trusted Verizon root certificates. These certificates are the > Verizon Global Root CA, the Baltimore CyberTrust Root CA, and the Verizon > Root CA. There were many reasons the acquisition made sense, including > acquisition of a root that had cross-signed DigiCert for many years. The > ubiquity of the Verizon roots is wide-spread, which meant a lot of CAs like > to cross-sign with them. Another significant reason for the acquisition was > an attempt to improve the CA industry. After watching the issuance of > wildcard EV certs, non-compliant subordinate CAs, and certs with poor > profiles, we made a conscious decision to purchase these roots with the > intention of migrating them to more complaint system. We felt that helping > these CAs get to the point of regular audits and best practices would raise > the quality of the entire industry. > > > > Prior to the acquisition, we were made aware of several potential > non-compliances by Verizon's customers. We worked closely with Verizon to > clean up many of the Sub CAs, including revoking CAs that would never be > compliant with the requirements and attempting to technically constrain > others. Sub CAs were revoked because they either didn't have an audit, were > unresponsive to communication, or couldn't control their issuance. Verizon > was a great partner and took a very proactive approach in removing CAs that > were not actively working towards compliance. Unfortunately, the age of the > roots and large number of cross-signs led to a lot of missing paperwork and > certain issues in identifying which CAs were covered by audits. Prior to > closing we believed there were approximately five technically constrained sub > CAs and around 20 unconstrained sub CAs. Turns out there were actually more > than 200, each with various levels of compliance. Most of these Sub CAs > operated under the Baltimore Cybertrust root, which was created in 2000. > > > > To their credit, Verizon revoked 48 of the issuing CAs prior to DigiCert's > acquisition of the roots. Unfortunately, this left around 150 for our small > team to work through. Although the endeavor was daunting, Ben Wilson and > others worked to gather audit reports, email customers about compliance > dates, monitor certificates issued, and revoke non-compliant customers. > Verizon was very good at assisting us in these efforts. This information is > now recorded in the Mozilla database and continuously updated as the > information changes. > > > > Transition Process > > After our operational acquisition of the roots (which occurred the last part > of September, 2015), we identified 15 expired issuing CAs, 70 revoked sub > CAs, 131 audited sub CAs, and 36 where the status was unknown. Since then, > we've revoked 25 issuing CAs and assisted others with technical constraints, > exodus from the Omniroot cross-signing program, or obtaining audits. Of the > existing sub CAs, about half remain operational and are either audited or > technically constrained. The other half are either winding down or have been > revoked. All revoked certificates were disclosed to Mozilla via Salesforce > and should be part of OneCRL. > > > > Issuing CAs > > There are only a handful of non-audited sub CAs remaining (see > https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures#disclosureincomplete). We have a plan for > each of them that we'd like to share with you. We welcome both browser and > public feedback. This is, of course, simply a proposal on how to finish the > transition and provide transparency into where we are at. We are certainly > willing to modify the plan as needed to further online security and meet the > requirements of the root store operators. > > > > The seven companies listed below are responsible for the remaining unaudited > sub CAs: > > > > 1. ABB has three unaudited issuing CAs. ABB didn't undergo an audit > earlier this year on the assumption that their sub CAs were technically > constrained. Unfortunately, the constraints weren't properly implemented, a > fact that escaped notice until Rob Stradling's excellent tool exposed a > deficiency a few months ago in how Verizon issuance process. Although Verizon > restricted domain names and IPv4 IP addresses, the CAs could still issue for > the IPv6 space. Despite promptly replacing the certificates after > discovering the gap, we haven't revoked the issuing CAs. Right now, ABB is > actively working to transition its servers to the new, properly-constrained > certificates. We expect the transition to complete by the end of December > 2016. We are revoking the issuing CAs as the migration completes and expect > all of the ABB non-compliant issuing CAs to be revoked on January 5th. No > new certs are being issued from the faulty issuing CAs. > > > > 2. Similar to ABB, Verizon created two technically constrained issuing > CAs for Bechtel. Like ABB, Verizon failed to restrict IPv6 issuance for each > of the issuing CAs. Bechtel is actively migrating the remaining 785 > certificates to properly constrained issuing CAs. The migration process will > complete at the end of December, after which the non-conforming issuing CAs > will be revoked. They are included in our January 5th revocation plan. This > will also revoke the three issuing CAs created further down in the chain. > > > > 3. Dell also thought they were technically constrained. Similar to ABB > and Bechtel, the restriction was inadequate. Fortunately, Dell isn't using > the issuing CAs and doesn't require migration. We've previously revoked four > issuing certificates (Bug 1279066) but missed one during the process. We plan > to immediately revoke the remaining issuing CA and all CAs subordinate to the > issuing CA. > > > > 4. While Certipost is hosted by Verizon's internal infrastructure, the > Verizon WebTrust audit letter did not specifically identify the Certipost CAs > as audited. DigiCert has been in the process of revoking these CAs but there > is some confusion about the effects of the revocation. Apparently the > certificates are used for air traffic control in Europe and there is a fear > that revoking the intermediate may cause planes to fall out of the sky. After > trying to sort out this mess and giving Certipost time to transition, we've > decided to revoke the issuing certificates the last week of November. We > believe there are over 400 outstanding certificates that will be affected. > > > > 5. Postecom refused an audit and decided to exit operation of a CA. We > have not yet revoked their issuing CAs in order to give them time to migrate > to a different CA infrastructure. They asked that we keep the issuing CAs > active until December 31, 2016 to complete the migration. Although they have > worked on migrating certs, Postecom still has 1185 certificates to migrate in > the next two months. The issuing CAs are scheduled for revocation on January > 5th. > > > > 6. Vodafone completed a Webtrust audit this year. Unfortunately, we found > out that the audit has qualifications. The audit report hasn't issued yet > but should later in November. Once the audit report issues, we will provide a > copy of the report for evaluation. We've been told that the qualifications > are related to the network security guidelines. They probably also include > the SHA1 issuance, although we haven't been told that directly. Vodafone is > currently designing and building a new CA infrastructure that will house all > of their operations. To ensure compliance, we are requiring the new > infrastructure to undergo a point-in-time audit in December. We are also > requiring a full audit on their issuance processes at the start of next year. > A full, non-qualified audit report is expected by March 31, 2016. Although > this is well past the compliance date, we are sympathetic to Vodafone as they > have been actively working towards compliance. They also have 4,580 public > facing SSL certs makes revocation tricky. They issue a lot of client > certificates from these sub CAs where revocation could have a potentially > devastating effect on telecommunications. Because of the large impact of > revocation and how hard Vodafone is working to migrate, we'd like permission > for them to comply by March 31, 2017, assuming serious issues are not > uncovered by the audit report and that the December and January audits pass > unqualified. > > > > 7. The Belgium government is our biggest challenge in migrating Verizon > customers. With over 20 issuing CAs, Belgium has the largest outstanding > non-compliant infrastructure. The operators have also claimed that revoking > their issuing CAs is illegal (in Belgium). The government is using the > issuing CA for creating personal identification (e-ID) cards throughout the > country. The Belgium government has dictated that they set the rules, not us. > Although the Belgium government does not have an audit yet, Verizon has > represented that the issuing CAs are hosted in the Verizon infrastructure and > are potentially covered by the Verizon audit. We've asked Verizon to provide > an updated audit report showing coverage of the Belgium issuing CAs by > December 1, 2016. If the report is not delivered by December 1, 2016, we plan > to immediately revoke the issuing CAs. If, for whatever reason, we are > unable to revoke the issuing CAs at that time, we would certainly not object > to the browsers distrusting the issuing CAs issued to Belgium. > > > > Resolving these remaining seven issues will, bring all Verizon's sub CAs into > compliance with the audit requirements by March 31, 2017. As of January 2017, > all sub CAs operated under the Verizon umbrella will have a non-qualified > audit with the exception of Vodafone, which will have a non-qualified > point-in-time audit by then. > > > > SHA-1 > > Although by March 31, 2017, all former Verizon customers will comply with the > audit portion of the BRs, experience has recently shown that strict > compliance of profile requirements is more difficult to enforce. Such is the > case of the SHA1 certificates issued by Nets Norway, Siemens, and Vodafone. > Nets Norway and Siemens were both ETSI audited while Vodafone opted for a > Webtrust audit. > > > > Shortly after the Verizon transaction, we sent a statement to each CA > announcing the acquisition and our expectation of strict compliance with the > BRs and network security requirements. On January 27, 2016, we sent another > email to all CAs that reiterated the need for strict adherence to standards > and requirement for CAs to update their infrastructure as needed to maintain > an unqualified audit. The specifically stated that issuance of internal name > certificates and SHA1 certificates is strictly forbidden. Nets Norway, > Vodafone, and Siemens all received a copy of this email. > > > > As all the sub CAs should have been aware of the requirements in 2015, were > reminded this year, and had audits of their infrastructure, we are very > disappointed by the recently discovered SHA-1 issuance. We've contacted each > of the sub CAs asking for an explanation on what happened and why their > infrastructure wasn't sufficient to prevent SHA1 issuance. > > > > Of the SHA1 cert issuers, Vodafone is the only sub CA that responded by > providing a timeline for compliance, information about how they are migrating > to new CA (which we already knew), and a plan going forward to undergo an > audit and make sure technical constraints are active to prevent additional > SHA1 certificates. Siemens replied that they are revoking the SHA1 > certificates, that issuance was a mistake, and that they are taking action to > prevent additional mis-issuance. However, the specifics of their plan are > vague (other than providing operational training to prevent reoccurrence). > For both Vodafone and Siemens, this is their first offense in mis-issuing a > SHA1 certificate, and we'd ask for leniency. We do recognize that this is a > serious concern and can revoke the issuing CAs if the action is decided > necessary. For full disclosure, Siemens is transitioning away from the > Verizon root certificate to another CA. We are only maintained the validity > of their cross-sign in a good faith effort to help them complete the > transition. We were planning to revoke the issuing CAs early next year > (January 5th) once the transition is completed. > > > > The final CA is Nets Norway. Unlike the other two issuing CAs, Nets Norway > issued a SHA1 certificate earlier this year. Although Nets Norway promptly > revoked the certificate and provided verbal assurances that SHA1 issuance > would be restricted, the company obviously failed to take adequate measures. > We informed Nets Norway that we are revoking their issuing CA later this > month. We haven't revoked them yet because we wanted to complete the incident > report first and allow public comment before finalizing the decision. > > > > Our investigation of Verizon's, Postecom's, and Telecom Italia's issuance of > a SHA1 certificate is ongoing. As mentioned above, Postecom is scheduled for > revocation. Our plan for now is to keep the current revocation schedule for > Postecom as the SHA1 issuance occurred twice during January. We haven't > formed a plan for Verizon or Telecom Italia yet and are waiting to hear back > from their representatives. Verizon issued a single certificate back in > January. Telecom Italia issued three in early January and February. Each of > these incidents were only recently discovered by DigCert. We've since added > an active monitor to crt.sh to alert our compliance team if a SHA1 > certificate issues. > > > > Conclusion > > Hopefully this helps explain the status of the Verizon transition and the > recent SHA1 incidents. We are still collecting information from the three > issuing sub CAs about what happened, but I hope this is enough to provide > transparency and make a decision on how to proceed. > > > > Despite the difficulties in bringing these customers into compliance, we > still think the Verizon transaction was a good move from a compliance > perspective. Helping these sub CAs identify problems and improve their > processes has been an enlightening experience and given us insight on some of > the difficulties other CAs may face in complying with the BRs. The process > has been interesting exercise in helping others make remediation plans and > trying to accelerate what feels like a slow-moving project. Despite the long > nights, headaches, and frustrations, I think we've been successful in our > original goal of improving the security ecosystem. I'm also very pleased that > the end of the transition is almost here! > > > > We appreciate your feedback and look forward to your comments. > > > > Sincerely, > > Jeremy So did sub CAs have their dedicated CA team? And did Digicert supervise these sub CAs during the daily operation or 100% trust them doing well since they have WebTrust audit? _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list email@example.com https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
_______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy