I. Misissued certificates for example.com
On 2016-07-14, Symantec misissued the following certificates for example.com:
https://crt.sh/?sha256=A8F14F52CC1282D7153A13316E7DA39E6AE37B1A10C16288B9024A9B9DC3C4C6
https://crt.sh/?sha256=8B5956C57FDCF720B6907A4B1BC8CA2E46CD90EAD5C061A426CF48A6117BFBFA
https://crt.sh/?sha256=94482136A1400BC3A1136FECA3E79D4D200E03DD20B245D19F0E78B5679EAF48
https://crt.sh/?sha256=C69AB04C1B20E6FC7861C67476CADDA1DAE7A8DCF6E23E15311C2D2794BFCD11
I confirmed with ICANN, the owner of example.com, that they did not
authorize these certificates. These certificates were already revoked
at the time I found them.
II. Suspicious certificates for domains containing the word "test"
On 2016-11-15 and 2016-10-26, Symantec issued certificates for various
domains containing the word "test" which I strongly suspect were
misissued:
https://crt.sh/?sha256=b81f339b971eb763cfc686adbac5c164b89ad03f8afb55da9604fd0d416bbd21
https://crt.sh/?sha256=f45d090e1bf24738a8e86734aa7acf7c9e65b619eb19660b1f73c9973f11b841
https://crt.sh/?sha256=bcbc26c9e06c4fe1c9e4d55fa27a501c504ea84e23e114b8ac004f7c0776cd0b
https://crt.sh/?sha256=f0935ce297419cc148bde49a7a123f2b2419cdd52df8e7f49e7bba07fe872559
https://crt.sh/?sha256=3601ab49034e69d6e2137a80e511a0640252f444b75d6baca7bf4672c35652a5
I have not attempted to contact the owners of these domains for
confirmation, as doing so is probably not feasible (many of the domains
are owned by squatters). However, the following facts lead to me to
believe that these certificates were misissued:
1. The subject DNs contain clearly bogus values, such as:
C=KR, ST=1, L=1, O=12, OU=1
C=KR, ST=1, L=1, O=1, OU=1
C=KR, ST=1, L=1, O=12, OU=1
C=KR, ST=Test1, L=Test, O=Test
Note that the misissued example.com certificates also contain C=KR in
their subjects.
2. The third certificate in the list above contains a SAN for
DNS:*.crosscert.com - note that three of the misissued example.com
certificates contain "Crosscert" in their Subject Organization.
3. None of these certificates have been observed in the wild by Censys.
The live certificate for www.test.com was issued by Network Solutions.
4. The first two certificates in the list above both contain DNS SANs
for *all* of the following domains:
test.com
test1.com
test2.com
test3.com
test4.com
test5.com
test6.com
test7.com
test8.com
test9.com
test11.com
With the exception of test4.com and test8.com, these domains are
registered to different entities and appear to be wholly unrelated with
one another in both ownership and operation. It is unlikely that the
owners of these domains would collaborate to authorize these
certificates.
These certificates were already revoked at the time I found them.
III. Certificates with O=Test
Finally, Symantec has issued a large number of certificates with the
following attributes in the Subject:
C=KR, ST=test, L=test, O=test, OU=test
e.g.:
https://crt.sh/?sha256=09AECE5B94BBB8A9EE2152FA6FB7261630124918DA015EB3571508EF6D31DD30
https://crt.sh/?sha256=CC0A2AE0EF5B1A6CF242D7B4C77AC9F05B49494B42C8486B47804874734CFC1C
https://crt.sh/?sha256=F177AC0064167354025CE12B3914A0E056628DD31152B5DF22E41913FC9D9B45
https://crt.sh/?sha256=DA7B1D433C071DA7A389EE2A4CAB854B89E441277B41E608F05FB7C7C6B2A761
For more, see:
https://crt.sh/?O=test
I doubt there is an organization named "test" located in "test, Korea."
Regards,
Andrew
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