Hi Ryan,

On 09/02/17 19:55, Ryan Hurst wrote:
> - The EV OID associated with this permission is associated with GlobalSign 
> and not Google and,

Which EV OID are you referring to, precisely?

> - GlobalSign is active member in good standing with the respective root 
> programs and,
> - Google will not be issuing EV SSL certificates,
> - Google will operate these roots under their own CP/CPS’s and associated 
> OIDs,
> - Google issuing a certificate with the GlobalSign OIDs would qualify as 
> miss-issuance.
> 
> That it would be acceptable for us not to undergo a EV SSL audit,
> and that GlobalSign could keep the EV right for the associated subordinate
> CA for the remaining validity period to facilitate the transition
> (assuming continued compliance).

Just to be clear: GlobalSign continues to operate at least one subCA
under a root which Google has purchased, and that root is EV-enabled,
and the sub-CA continues to do EV issuance (and is audited as such) but
the root is no longer EV audited, and nor is the rest of the hierarchy?

> When looking at this issue it is important to keep in mind Google has
> operated a WebTrust audited subordinate CA under Symantec for quite a
> long time. As part of this they have maintained audited facilities,
> and procedures appropriate for offline key management, CRL/OCSP
> generation, and other related activities. Based on this, and the
> timing of both our audit, and key transfer all parties concluded it
> would be sufficient to have the auditors provide an opinion letter
> about the transfer of the keys and have those keys covered by the
> subsequent annual audit.

Can you tell us what the planned start/end dates for the audit period of
that annual audit are/will be?

Are the Google roots and/or the GlobalSign-acquired roots currently
issuing EE certificates? Were they issuing certificates between 11th
August 2016 and 8th December 2016?

Gerv
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