Issue R: Insecure Issuance API (2013 or earlier - November 2016)

In April 2015, security consultant Chris Byrne responsibly disclosed two 
potential vulnerabilities related to our Quick Invite feature, which enables a 
reseller to invite pre-selected customers to enroll for certificates, via 
customized emails to the customer that contain deep links for enrollment, 
specific to the invitee. Consistent with Symantec's commitment to taking action 
when issues arise, Symantec promptly commenced an investigation following this 
April 2015 disclosure. As a result, both issues identified in this disclosure 
were remediated by May 20, 2015.

As there currently seems to be some confusion around this disclosure, we want 
to provide clarification. First, it is inaccurate to conflate the April 2015 
disclosure and the recent RA topic [Mozilla Issue T]. The Quick Invite feature 
is not an issuance API, and is unrelated to the RA delegated authentication 
capabilities.

Second, third-party reporting on Mr. Byrne's March 24, 2017 post has suggested 
that private keys were potentially accessible. Not only is this inaccurate, 
it's technically not feasible. This is because Symantec does not have access to 
our customers' TLS server private keys.

The first issue identified in this disclosure only occurred in the case that an 
invite deep link was intentionally exposed or an attacker had control over a 
victim's email account, allowing the attacker to click on that link and enable 
submission of a CSR to the reseller as if they were the legitimate invitee. 
Even in this scenario, proper domain vetting still happened and the attacker 
would have still needed to have ownership or control of the domain in the 
attacker's requested cert before the cert would be issued. Importantly, we do 
not believe that there was any danger of a cert being issued without proper 
demonstration of ownership or control of the domain. Nevertheless, as a result 
of this April 2015 disclosure, and consistent with our effort to continually 
improve our processes, policies and controls, we now require manual approval in 
cases where data reuse rules would have previously enabled us to issue based on 
prior approvals.

The second April 2015 issue was related to the TTL (Time-To-Live) of deep links 
associated with certificate lifecycle management for our resellers' customers. 
In this case, if the deep link was somehow exposed or the email account was 
compromised, an attacker could perform lifecycle operations on that 
certificate. While our resellers control the TTL of the Quick Invite deep link, 
which can be set to as little as one day, Symantec controls the TTL of the 
certificate lifecycle management deep links, which are only sent to the email 
address associated with the certificate. We proactively changed the TTL of 
these deep links from five days to two hours in order to reduce the window of 
exposure in the event the deep links are inappropriately exposed. In both 
situations, Symantec responded quickly and decisively to remediate the issues 
at hand and to enhance our overall security measures.
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