On 2017-05-17 13:23, Michael Casadevall wrote:
On 05/17/2017 05:04 AM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
If the key is compromised, you can't rely on any date information
anymore, you need to revoke it completely and break things.


Won't that only be true in certificates without SCTs? Once you have a
SCT, you have an independent timestamp you can check beside the
NotBefore value, and can independently confirm since CT logs are
append-only.

(Granted, I realize nothing actually checks the SCT in this way to my
knowledge, but the idea itself may be on semi-solid ground).

Yes, and I guess that's the reason why with code signing they also use a timestamp service. And I guess we could require either an SCT or a timestamp if they want signatures to remain valid.


Kurt

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