On 05/06/17 14:29, Alex Gaynor wrote: > As I've expressed before, I find it baffling that this still happens.
I am also disappointed. I have half a mind to keep track of how often this happens per CA, and impose a mandatory delay of 1 month per incident to that CA's next attempt to include a new root or get a trust bit or EV change in our store. :-) Aside from taking a note of how often this happens and it perhaps appearing in a future CA investigation as part of evidence of incompetence, does anyone else have ideas about how we can further incentivise CA compliance with a requirement which was promulgated some time ago, for which all the deadlines have passed, and which should be a simple matter of paperwork? > To > approach this more productively, I'd be very appreciative if someone from a > CA could describe how they approach disclosing intermediates, where it fits > into their process, how they track progress, etc. Well, I suspect the processes are different per-CA, and if you get such an explanation, it'll be from a CA which doesn't make this sort of mistake :-) Also, different CAs have different PKI complexities. While the deadline we imposed on them for getting things in order has passed, I would be a bit less grumpy about DigiCert discovering a 'new' old intermediate in their Verizon-inherited mess that they didn't know about before, than if some small CA with a simple PKI doesn't disclose one they issued a couple of months ago. Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
