On Tuesday, 6 June 2017 21:08:54 UTC+1, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > Standards defining organization.
More usually a Standards _Development_ Organization. I wouldn't usually feel the need to offer this correction but in this context we care a good deal about the fact that SDOs are where the actual engineering is done, where the expertise about the particular niche being standardised exists. Even in the IETF, which is unusual in having some pretty technical people making its top level decisions, the serious work is mostly done in specialist working groups, with their products percolating up afterwards. For most standards bodies the top level stuff is purely politics - at the ITU the members are (notionally) sovereign nations themselves, same for the UPU, at ISO they're entire national standards bodies, and so on - utterly unsuitable to the meat of standards development itself. Most expertise is instead present in smaller, specialised SDOs in these cases. Anyway, to Jakob's point it is _extremely_ unlikely that a new piece of infrastructure will spring into existence fully formed and ready for use in anger in the Web PKI without enough time for Mozilla, and m.d.s.policy to evaluate it and if necessary update the relevant policy documents. Much more likely, in my opinion, is that something half-baked is tried by a CA, and later realised to have opened an unsuspected hole in security. Nothing even prevents this policy being updated to permit, for example, trials of some particular promising new idea that needs testing at scale, although I think in most cases that won't be necessary. Consider the CRL signing idea, this can be tested perfectly well without using any trusted CA or subCA keys at all. A final production version would probably use trusted keys, but you don't need to start with them to see it work. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy