On Monday, 19 June 2017 09:32:20 UTC+1, troy.f...@cisco.com wrote: > The compromised certificate for drmlocal.cisco.com serial number > 6170CE2EC8B7D88B4E2EB732E738FE3A67CF672 has been revoked. A new certificate > is being reissued to drmlocal.cisco.com and we will work with the developers > of the YES video player to ensure that the issue does not happen again.
Troy, the name makes me suspicious, what - other than this trick which isn't a permissible use - was the drmlocal.cisco.com name ever for in the first place? If it doesn't have any legitimate use, there was no purpose in seeking a re-issue of the certificate. The right way to approach this problem will be to issue unique keys and certificates to individual instances of the system, this both satisfies the BRs and (which is why) achieves the actual security goal of partitioning each customer so that they can't MitM each other. It is a little surprising to me that (at least so far as I know) no manufacturer has an arrangement with a CA to issue them large volumes of per-device certificates in this way. I expect that Comodo (to name one which definitely has business issuing very large volumes) would be able to accommodate a deal to issue say, a million certificates per year with an agreed suffix (say, .nowtv.cisco.com) for a fixed fee. The first time it's attempted there would be some engineering work to be done in production and software for the system, but nothing truly novel and that work is re-usable for future products. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
