On 18/07/17 15:31, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote:
On 18/07/2017 16:19, Rob Stradling wrote:
On 17/07/17 16:14, Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy wrote:
This certificate, issued by “Intesa Sanpaolo CA Servizi Esterni Enhanced” which chains up to a Baltimore CyberTrust root, contains an invalid dnsName of “www.intesasanpaolovita..biz” (note the two dots):

https://crt.sh/?q=2B95B474A2646CA28DC244F1AE829C850EA41CF64C75E11A94FE8D228735977B&opt=cablint,x509lint

This raises some questions about the technical controls in place for issuance from this CA.

Yesterday evening Jonathan privately made me aware of a leaf certificate (https://crt.sh/?id=73190674) with two SAN:dNSNames that contain consecutive dots, which was issued by a Comodo intermediate. He found this cert using the crt.sh DB's lint records.

This morning Robin and I have investigated this bug in our code and we've taken the following actions: - We've deployed a hotfix to our CA system to prevent any further "double dot" mis-issuances.

- We've confirmed that the bug only affected labels to the left of the registrable domain. (e.g., dNSNames of the form www..domain.com were not always rejected, but those of the form www.domain..com were always rejected).

This doesn't match the one reported by Ben Wilson, which also exhibits various Microsoft related oddities:

https://crt.sh/?id=172218371&opt=cablint,x509lint

Hi Jakob.  Why would you expect it to?

Jonathan found certs containing "double dots" in dNSNames in leaf certs that chain to both DigiCert roots and Comodo roots.

Note that DigiCert != Comodo.

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Reply via email to