I concur in full with Nick Lamb's comments and positions on this matter.

There is no reasonable short cut to actually doing the DNSSEC thing if we want 
to usefully intertwine those technologies at all.

There IS significant benefit in enforcing complete DNSSEC validation for (all) 
the domain validation DNS queries where DNSSEC has been configured for the 
relevant zones.

This is especially the case for CAA records, which have an explicit security 
function: controlling, at a minimum, who may issue publicly trusted 
certificates for a given FQDN.

I will note that from the software development perspective, I concede that many 
of the DNS query APIs don't surface (at least in a friendly way) exactly what 
the nature of the DNSSEC validation failure is or at what layer of delegation 
the validation fails.

My position is that ultimately, that doesn't really matter:  If a CA wanted a 
quick and easy path to differentiating whether a domain has a DNSSEC problem or 
a CAA problem, chase the queries from the root down both with DNSSEC validation 
on and with DNSSEC validation off.  If no errors arise (because DNSSEC is not 
configured, etc) then rely on the CAA records alone.

If, however, a DNSSEC validated response comes back but errors exist on DNSSEC 
enabled queries for the CAA records, presume there's a DNSSEC problem of some 
sort and let the DNS / site admin work out the specific failure.  
Alternatively, do further digging for the mode of failure outside of the 
issuance path, in a separate after-adverse-decisioning debug / diagnostic path.

It is undeniable that DNSSEC validated query resolution takes longer than 
queries without DNSSEC.  Regardless, these are not terribly lengthy.  If the 
finding is that they are lengthy, reduce the local max timeout for whatever 
phases are taking too long.

I'm having trouble understanding how even several seconds of (asynchronous) 
delay can be a factor of great concern for a commercial CA.  I would assume 
that all kinds of checks are going on in parallel with callbacks hitting and 
the certificate advancing to signing when all the necessary callbacks have 
updated the test status to good.  I'm certain that one absolutely could build 
such a set of asynchronous work queues which would perform tests in a 
significantly parallel fashion for a great many pending certificates and then 
push each pending certificate to the actual signer in the moment that the last 
callback for a given required test posts GOOD on a particular pending issue.  
Let them process out-of-order prior to hitting the signer, submitting to the 
final FIFO signing queue in the instant that the last test which clears the 
issuance decisions transitions to positive.

I'd like to comment that DNSSEC and CAA in combination are, to my mind, the 
only presently available solution of an unambiguous nature for prevention of 
fraudulent domain-validation success results in a world where a significantly 
connected BGP participant might hijack ones IP space.  On this basis, I assert 
that there is real and distinct value in enforcing the sanctity of CAA or 
sanctity of lack of CAA via DNSSEC validation wherever DNSSEC has been 
configured.

Without managing to hoodwink the TLD registry or associated TLD registrar for a 
domain, there is no way for a successful IP space hijack to yield manipulated 
results to DNS queries answered by authoritatives in said hijacked IP space -- 
if and only if DNSSEC validation is performed.

I put forth that the security of the root zone delegation, and delegation from 
the TLD registrar/registry to the authoritative zone IS or CAN BE far more 
secure than DNS queries without cryptographic validation in a world where the 
IP space underpinning an authoritative DNS server can be (fairly) easily 
hijacked.

For what it's worth, I'd also LOVE to see an extension option to CAA records 
which standardize ways of indicating acceptable domain validation methodologies 
along with acceptable CAs.  For example, it would be nice to be able to say 
"Allow only Let's Encrypt to issue; Allow issuance only when domain validation 
mechanism relies exclusively upon DNS".  In this environment, even if someone 
hijacks the IP space of a web server within the domain, they are unable to get 
a certificate issued because they can't skip the CAA and the DNSSEC is keeping 
the issuance from occurring because it requires a DNS proof for issuance, 
rather than allowing the random-verification-content-in-a-well-known-url 
validation.

Just my thoughts on the matter...

Thanks,

Matt Hardeman
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