On Monday, September 25, 2017 at 3:18:44 PM UTC-5, Matthew Hardeman wrote:
> Has there been any serious discussion of the potential benefit of CAA 
> reporting for certificate issuance attempts?
> 
> I'm aware of what the spec says and the SHOULD language, etc...
> 
> I'm not a CA and don't represent one.
> 
> I do, however, think that it's easier to get buy-in for changes to CA 
> infrastructure when there is a strong showing for cost/benefit relationship.
> 
> In a post-CT world, issuances which occur will be easily detected quite 
> promptly.
> 
> I am unsure of the value of a report issuing for a failed issuance attempt.  
> "Oh, yea, that wasn't me.  Someone's looking to attack."  How does that help? 
>  One should always assume that one is under attack.  Perhaps it allows you to 
> identify an internal party attempting to get a certificate issued and allows 
> you to work with that party to correctly get a certificate issued, but 
> wouldn't that legitimate inside party have reached out internally anyway when 
> they encountered a problem?
> 
> I'm just not sure I understand the point of the reporting in terms of 
> deriving real security value.
> 
> I think it behooves the community, in selecting items to advance for 
> mandatory compliance within the CA space, to choose the requirements imposed 
> carefully and with a view to deriving real objective security value.

The BRs are indeed a bit ambiguous on this point, but my interpretation of this 
statement

> CAs MUST document potential issuances that were prevented by a CAA record in 
> sufficient detail to provide feedback to the CAB Forum on the circumstances, 
> and SHOULD dispatch reports of such issuance requests to the contact(s) 
> stipulated in the CAA iodef record(s), if present

is that the reports should only be sent in a situation where a certificate 
_would_ have been issued if not for the CAA records. In other words, all other 
security measures intended to prevent misissuance failed, and if not for the 
presence of the CAA record a valid certificate for your domain would have been 
issued to a potentially malicious actor. In that situation, you'd definitely 
want to be informed so you can investigate what allowed the attacker to get 
that far along in the process.

That's my understanding anyway.
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