It also protects consumers of the Mozilla Root Program who are not using it with a browser -- I know it has been expressed before that that's not a totally supported use case, but nonetheless it is _extremely_ common to use a derivative of the Mozilla trust store with verifies like OpenSSL, which do not limit signature hash algorithms.
Alex On Sat, Oct 7, 2017 at 3:02 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote: > On 04/10/17 23:38, Nick Lamb wrote: > > However if I understand the situation correctly, this situation is > > already very low risk anyway with no reasonable expectation that it > > could be exploited against a competent SSL/TLS client which for some > > reason still accepts SHA1 and of course no risk for e.g. modern > > Firefox which doesn't accepts SHA1 anyway. If I haven't understood > > (please anyone jump in) then my assessment may be utterly wrong. > > Of course, this is an argument for ceasing to regulate SHA-1 issuance at > all, because no modern browser accepts it, so why bother? But I don't > think we are quite ready to go there; it does have the useful secondary > effect of going some way to force obsolete software (like old XP) off > the Internet. > > Gerv > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
