A couple of thoughts: 1) I'm not sure why you believe Option 2 is likely to result in a quicker transition? 2) Option 2 starts "Add code to Firefox..". What's the plan for non-firefox users of the Mozilla root list? Isn't there a pretty substantial risk that others users don't correctly implement the partial distrust, resulting in a trust/security risk?
David On Monday, October 16, 2017 at 6:32:54 PM UTC+1, Gervase Markham wrote: > As per previous discussions and > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Symantec_Issues, a consensus proposal was > reached among multiple browser makers for a graduated distrust of > Symantec roots. > > Here is Mozilla’s planned timeline for the graduated distrust of > Symantec roots (subject to change): > > * January 2018 (Firefox 58): Notices in the Developer Console will warn > about Symantec certificates issued before 2016-06-01, to encourage site > owners to migrate their TLS certs. > > * May 2018 (Firefox 60): Websites will show an untrusted connection > error if they have a TLS cert issued before 2016-06-01 that chains up to > a Symantec root. > > * October 2018 (Firefox 63): Removal/distrust of Symantec roots, with > caveats described below. > > Mozilla’s release calendar is here: > https://wiki.mozilla.org/RapidRelease/Calendar > > However, there are some subCAs of the Symantec roots that are > independently operated by companies whose operations have not been > called into question, and they will experience significant hardship if > we do not provide a longer transition period for them. For both > technical and non-technical reasons, a year is an extremely unrealistic > timeframe for these subCAs to transition to having their certificates > cross-signed by another CA. For example, the subCA may have implemented > a host of pinning solutions in their products that would fail with > non-Symantec-chaining certificates, or the subCA may have large numbers > of devices that would need to be tested for interoperability with any > potential future vendor. And, of course contractual negotiations may > take a significant amount of time. > > The subCAs that we know of that fall into this category belong to Google > and Apple. If there are any other subCAs that fall into this category, > please let us know immediately. Google has one such subCA; Apple has seven. > > There are two ways that we can provide a smoother transition for these > subCAs. > > Option 1) > Temporarily treat these subCAs as directly-included trust-anchors. > Mozilla prefers *not* to take this approach, because even if clearly > explained up front that it is a temporary solution with deadlines, it > would be very easy for people to start treating such a subCA as a > regular trust anchor, and thereby have that subCA become a de facto > included CA. Additionally, it could become very complicated to remove > such subCAs in the future, especially if they have not performed the > recommended transitions. > > Option 2) > Add code to Firefox to disable the root such that only certain subCAs > will continue to function. So, the final dis-trust of Symantec roots may > actually involve letting one or two of the root certs remain in > Mozilla’s trust store, but having special code to distrust all but > specified subCAs. We would document the information here: > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Additional_Trust_Changes > And Mozilla would add tooling to the CCADB to track these special subCAs > to ensure proper CP/CPS/audits until they have been migrated and > disabled, and the root certs removed. Mozilla will need to also follow > up with these subCAs to ensure they are moving away from these root > certificates and are getting cross-signed by more than one CA in order > to avoid repeating this situation. > > According to option 2 and the plan listed above, here is how the > currently-included Symantec root certs will be treated in Firefox 63: > > = Symantec roots to be disabled via code, *not* removed from NSS = > > GeoTrust Global CA > GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G2 > GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3 > > = Symantec roots that will be fully removed from NSS = > > GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority > GeoTrust Universal CA > GeoTrust Universal CA 2 > Symantec Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4 > Symantec Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority - G6 > Symantec Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4 > Symantec Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority - G6 > thawte Primary Root CA > thawte Primary Root CA - G2 > thawte Primary Root CA - G3 > VeriSign Class 1 Public PCA - G3 > VeriSign Class 2 Public PCA - G3 > VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3 > VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4 > VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 > VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority > > As always, we appreciate your thoughtful and constructive feedback on this. > > Gerv > >  > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/blink-dev/eUAKwjihhBs%5B251-275%5D _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy