Godaddy LLC first became aware of possible ROCA vulnerability exposure on 
Monday October 16th 2017 at 9:30am. The following are the steps we took for 
detection, revocation, and the permanent fix of certificate provisioning:

•       Monday October 16th 2017 AZ, first became aware of the ROCA 
vulnerability.  We downloaded and modified the open source detection tool to 
audit 100% of the non-revoked and non-expired certs we had issued.  
•       Early am Wednesday October 18th AZ we had our complete list of 7 certs 
with the ROCA defect. We verified the results and proceeded to start the 
revocation process. While cert revocation was in progress we started 
researching the long-term detection and prevention of the weak CSR 
vulnerability. 
•       Early am Wednesday October 18th Rob Stradling released a list of certs 
with the vulnerability. 2/7 we revoked were on the list. 
https://misissued.com/batch/28/ 
•       Thursday October 19th by 2:02am AZ, we completed the 7 cert 
revocations. Revocations included customer outreach to advise the customer of 
the vulnerability.
•       Thursday October 19th AZ, two CSRs were submitted for commonNames 
“scada2.emsglobal.net” & “scada.emsglobal.net” and were issued. Each request 
had used the vulnerable keys for CSR generation.  We revoked the certs again on 
Thursday October 19th AZ. During this period, we reached out to the customer to 
educate them regarding the vulnerability and informing them they needed to 
generate a new keypair from an unimpacted device.  Customer was unreachable. 
Friday October 20thAZ,  another cert was issued for commonName 
“scada.emsglobal.net” using a CSR generated with a weak key. We then took 
measures to prevent future certs from being issued to the same common name and 
revoked the cert on October 20th 2017 AZ. 
commonName           crt.sh-link
scada.emsglobal.net  https://crt.sh/?id=3084867 

scada.emsglobal.net  https://crt.sh/?id=238721704   

scada.emsglobal.net  https://crt.sh/?id=238721807

scada2.emsglobal.net https://crt.sh/?id=238720969

scada2.emsglobal.net https://crt.sh/?id=238721559

•       Saturday October 21st 2017 AZ & Sunday October 22nd 2017 AZ, we scanned 
our cert store and identified 0 vulnerable certs. 
•       Monday October 23, 2017 AZ, we have deployed a permanent fix to prevent 
future CSRs generated using weak keys from being submitted. Post scanning of 
the environment concluded 0 certificates at risk. 
 
Below is a complete list of certs under GoDaddy management impacted by this 
vulnerability. 

Alias                          crt.sh-link
alarms.realtimeautomation.net  https://crt.sh/?id=33966207 

scada.emsglobal.net            https://crt.sh/?id=3084867
                               https://crt.sh/?id=238721704   
                               https://crt.sh/?id=238721807 

www.essicorp-scada.com         https://crt.sh/?id=238720405 

marlboro.bonavistaenergy.com   https://crt.sh/?id=238720743 

scada2.emsglobal.net           https://crt.sh/?id=238720969
                               https://crt.sh/?id=238721559 

www.jointboardclearscada.com   https://crt.sh/?id=238721242 

*.forgenergy.com               https://crt.sh/?id=238721435 

 
Regards,
Daymion Reynolds
GoDaddy PKI
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