As I understand it, Adam’s argument there was that to get value out of a 
revoked certificate, you need to be between the user and the web server so you 
can direct the traffic to your web server, so you’re already in position to 
also block revocation checks.  I don’t think that maps here because a lot of 
the scenarios EV assists with don’t involve an attacker being in that position.

I know the question has been raised before as to why most phishing sites use 
DV.  Some argue it’s because OV/EV are harder for people with bad intent to 
obtain.  Some argue it’s because DV is more ubiquitous across the web and thus 
more ubiquitous on phishing sites.  But regardless of which (or neither) is 
true, the very fact that EV certs are rarely (never?) used on phishing sites is 
in and of itself providing protection today to those of us who pay attention to 
it.  I’d argue that alone means the seat belt isn’t worthless, and we should 
focus on building better seat belts rather than cutting them out and relying on 
the air bag alone.

 

On 12/13/17, 3:46 PM, "Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy" 
<[email protected]> wrote:

    On 13/12/17 11:58, Tim Shirley wrote:
    > So many of the arguments made here, such as this one, as well as the 
recent demonstrations that helped start this thread, focus on edge cases.  And 
while those are certainly valuable to consider, they obscure the fact that 
“Green Bar” adds value in the mainstream use cases.  If we were talking about 
how to improve EV, then by all means focus on the edge cases.  The thing I 
don’t see in all this is a compelling argument to take away something that’s 
useful most of the time.
    
    My concern with this argument is that it's susceptible to the criticism
    that Adam Langley made of revocation checking:
    
https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062&d=kJGx2vx-xMRho_TXqyD3e8mI4fM_V-yKUKn2tKZHNQ&s=5&u=https%3a%2f%2fwww%2eimperialviolet%2eorg%2f2012%2f02%2f05%2fcrlsets%2ehtml
    
    "So [EV identity is] like a seat-belt that snaps when you crash. Even
    though it works 99% of the time, it's worthless because it only works
    when you don't need it."
    
    Gerv
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https://scanmail.trustwave.com/?c=4062&d=kJGx2vx-xMRho_TXqyD3e8mI4fM_V-yKUK2gu_0caA&s=5&u=https%3a%2f%2flists%2emozilla%2eorg%2flistinfo%2fdev-security-policy
    

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