On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 3:54:24 PM UTC-6, Andrew wrote:
> On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 3:09:31 PM UTC-6, Wayne Thayer wrote:
> > Thank you Ryan for raising this question, and to everyone who has been
> > contributing in a constructive manner to the discussion. A number of
> > excellent points have been raised on the effectiveness of EV in general and
> > on the practicality of solving the problems that exist with EV.
> > 
> > While we have concerns about the value of EV as well as the potential for
> > EV to actually harm users, Mozilla currently has no definite plans to
> > remove the EV UI from Firefox. At the very least, we want to see
> > Certificate Transparency required for all certificates before making any
> > change that is likely to reduce the use of EV certificates.
> > 
> > Is Google planning to remove the EV UI from desktop Chrome? If so, how does
> > that relate to the plan to mark HTTP sites as ‘Not secure’ [1]? Does this
> > imply the complete removal of HTTPS UI?
> > 
> > While we agree that improvements to EV validation won’t remove many of the
> > underlying issues that have been raised here, we hope that CAs will move
> > quickly to make the EV Subject information displayed in the address bar
> > more reliable and less confusing.
> > 
> > - Wayne
> > 
> > [1]
> > https://security.googleblog.com/2016/09/moving-towards-more-secure-web.html
> 
> So, given that Mozilla has no immediate plans to remove the EV UI from 
> Firefox, perhaps the UI should be adjusted to include the state the Subject 
> is registered in on the EV badge. No reason for that text to be any more 
> misleading than necessary. (I assume this is something we can pretty much all 
> agree on, yes?)

I agree that might be good, but especially on mobile devices screen real-estate 
is limited.

Perhaps the cab forum should with all due haste propose a full slate of 
improvements to the EV program, while there's still time to make their case.

I think Mr. Thayer's statement of Mozilla position at this point is an 
opportunity as well as an implied earliest time frame for deprecation.  If I 
were a CA [I'm not], I'd expend great effort to create measurable improvements 
to the EV program prior to then.
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