Hi Rob,

We've some costumers that really appreciates that we include them.

But I can also tell you that you are absolutely right and now we're studying to 
modify this parameter in our OCSP.

Thanks a lot
Juan Angel

-----Mensaje original-----
De: Rob Stradling [mailto:rob.stradl...@comodo.com] 
Enviado el: jueves, 18 de enero de 2018 12:21
Para: Juan Angel Martin (AC Camerfirma) <martin...@camerfirma.com>
CC: 'Wayne Thayer' <wtha...@mozilla.com>; 'mozilla-dev-security-policy' 
<mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
Asunto: Re: Camerfirma's misissued certificate

Hi Juan.  Is there a particular technical reason why you feel the need to 
include "all the certs chaining up to the roots" in your OCSP responses?

When an OCSP response is signed directly by the CA that issued the 
corresponding certificate, the OCSP response does not need to contain any 
certificates at all.

When a CA uses an Authorized Responder, the OCSP response needs to contain 1 
certificate (i.e., the leaf cert, issued directly by the CA, that contains the 
id-kp-ocspSigning EKU OID).

I don't see any circumstance in which including >1 certificate in an OCSP 
response provides any benefit.  All it does is bloat the OCSP response 
unnecessarily.

The TLS client's certificate path validation algorithm validates the issuing 
CA.  Therefore, the OCSP response validation algorithm only needs to validate 
the OCSP response up to that issuing CA, not all the way up to the root.

On 18/01/18 07:34, Juan Angel Martin (AC Camerfirma) via dev-security-policy 
wrote:
> Hello Wayne,
> 
>   
> 
> I’ve investigated the OCSP’s issue time ago, I can tell you that it’s related 
> with https://github.com/golang/go/issues/21527 cause we send all the certs 
> chaining up to the roots.
> 
>   
> 
> BR
> 
> Juan Angel
> 
>   
> 
> De: Wayne Thayer [mailto:wtha...@mozilla.com] Enviado el: miércoles, 
> 17 de enero de 2018 19:14
> Para: martin...@camerfirma.com
> CC: mozilla-dev-security-policy 
> <mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
> Asunto: Re: Camerfirma's misissued certificate
> 
>   
> 
> Thank you for reporting this misissuance. Since this is a different issue 
> than described in bug 1390977, I have created a new bug to track this problem 
> and your response: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1431164 
> Please also post your incident report here.
> 
>   
> 
> Also, the crt.sh link above is reporting the following OCSP error for this 
> certificate: "OCSP response contains bad number of certificates" Please 
> investigate.
> 
>   
> 
> - Wayne
> 
>   
> 
>   
> 
> On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 9:27 AM, Juan Angel Martin via dev-security-policy 
> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org 
> <mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> > wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I have to inform you about a SSL certificate misissued. OU contains 
> non-printable control characters.
> 
> https://crt.sh/?id=305441195
> 
> It has already been revoked.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Juan Angel Martin Gomez
> AC Camerfirma
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org 
> <mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org>
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
> 
>   
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
> 

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
Office Tel: +44.(0)1274.730505
Office Fax: +44.(0)1274.730909
www.comodo.com

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