On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> On 26/02/2018 10:27, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
>
>> I just came across this:
>>
>> https://www.recordedfuture.com/code-signing-certificates/
>>
>> I think the most important part of it is: "we confirmed with a high
>> degree of certainty that the certificates are created for a specific buyer
>> per request only and are registered using stolen corporate identities"
>>
>>
> I believe the claims there require investigation by the named CAs
> (Comodo and Digicert (Symantec) brands) and an appropriate incident
> report regarding the claimed misissuances.
>
> While I agree in theory, I don't think sufficient information has been
provided to allow a CA to investigate.

These are (allegedly) genuine misissuances to entities other than
> the identities named in the certificates, rather than technical
> "misissuances" in violation of formal technical requirements.
>
> These also appear to be systematic, as the alleged black market
> vendors claim to obtain such misissued certificates on demand.
>
> If the claims in that article are true, one or more vetting
> procedures obviously fall short of their required effectiveness.
> This may or may not be in accordance with BR and CPS minimum
> procedures, but it is obviously an ongoing and true danger to the
> relying parties at large.
>
>
These claims haven't been substantiated, but with multiple CAs allegedly
vulnerable, this appears to be a weakness in the EV Guidelines.

While the Mozilla root store only cares about the EV SSL subset of
> these misissuances, the EV codesign misissuances may involve failure
> of procedures also used for Mozilla-trusted uses (SSL and S/MIME),
> and thus should be included in incident reports.
>
>
> The claims of misissuance for EV codesign certificates (only indirectly
> relevant to Mozilla) are highly likely to be true, as EV codesign is
> only available for SmartCard/HSM/USBToken stored private keys, making
> theft of properly issued certificates near impossible.
>
>
>
> Enjoy
>
> Jakob
> --
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
> Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
> This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
> WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
>
>
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