Some thoughts:

1 - Should additional text be included to mandate strong cipher suites 
(http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=543) be used; it is not uncommon for me to find 
PKCS#12s with very weak cryptographic algorithms in use. Such guidance would be 
limited by Windows which does not support modern cryptographic algorithms for 
key protection but having some standard would be better than none though it 
would potentially hurt interoperability for those use cases if the chosen 
suites were not uniform.

2 - Should additional text be included to mandate the that CA resellers cannot 
be used as an escape to this requirement; e.g. today A CA may simply rely on a 
third-party to implement this practice to stay in conformance with the policy.

3 - Should additional text be included to require that the user provide part or 
all of the secrete used as the "password" on the PKCS#12 file and that CA 
cannot store the user provided value?
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