Maybe Jake’s opinion is not being discarded as readily as I supposed. However, Jake’s last message left me disturbed that he didn’t feel listened to. Apologies if I’m overblowing the issue, which are definitely hypothetical at this point. I did want Jake to feel like his input is an important part of this discussion board. Not saying anyone made him feel otherwise intentionally of course, but his last message seemed frustrated.
From: Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2018 10:49 AM To: Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]> Cc: Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]>; mozilla-dev-security-policy <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 12:04 PM Jeremy Rowley <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: I also should also emphasize that I’m speaking as Jeremy Rowley, not as DigiCert. Note that I didn’t say Google controlled the policy. However, as a module peer, Google does have significant influence over the policy and what CAs are trusted by Mozilla. Although everyone can participate in Mozilla discussions publicly, it’s a fallacy to state that a general participant has similar sway or authority to a module peer. That’s the whole point of having a separate class for peers compared to us general public. With Google acting as a CA and module peer, you now have one CA heavily influencing who its competitors are, how its competitors operate, and what its competitors can do. Although I personally find that you never misuse your power as a module peer, I can see how Jake has concerns that Google (as a CA) has very heavy influence over the platform that has historically been the CA watchdog (Mozilla). Jeremy, I think this again deserves calling out, because this is misrepresenting what module peership does, as well as the CA relationship. I linked you to the definition of Module Ownership, which highlights and emphasizes that the module peer is simply a recognized helper. To the extent there is any influence, it is through the public discussions here. If your concern is that the title confers some special advantage, that's to misread what module peer is. If your concern is that the participation - which provides solid technical arguments as well as the policy alternatives - is influential, then what you're arguing against is public participation. You're presenting these as factual, and that's misleading, so I'd like to highlight what is actually entailed. The circumstances are different between the scenarios you describe with respect to the other browsers, as is market share. If Microsoft wants to change CAs (and they already use multiple), they can without impacting public perception. If Apple wants to use another CA, they can without people commenting how odd it is that Apple doesn’t use the Apple CA. With Google controlling the CA and the Google browser, all incentive to eliminate any misbehaving Google CA disappears for financial reasons, public perception, and because Google can control the messaging (through marketshare and influence over Mozilla policy). Note that there is historical precedent for Google treating Google special – i.e. the exclusion for Google in the Symantec distrust plan. Thus, I think Jake’s concerns should not be discarded so readily. I can understand and appreciate why you have this perspective. I disagree that it's an accurate representation, and as shown by the previous message, it does not have factual basis. I think it's misleading to suggest that the concerns are being discarded, much like yours - they're being responded to with supporting evidence and careful analysis. However, they do not hold water, and while it would be ideal to convince you of this as well, it's equally important to be transparent about it. Your argument above seems to boil down to "People would notice if Google changed CAs, but not if Microsoft" - yet that's not supported (see, example, the usage of Let's Encrypt by Google, or the former usage of WoSign by Microsoft). Your argument about incentives entirely ignores the incentives I just described to you previously - which look at public perception, internet security, and ecosystem stability. Your argument about influence over Mozilla policy has already been demonstrated as false and misleading, but it seems you won't be convinced by that. And your suggestion of special treatment ignores the facts of the situation (the validation issues, the scoping of audits, that Apple and 2 other CAs were also included in the exclusion), ignores the more significant special treatment granted by other vendors (e.g. Apple's exclusion of a host of mismanaged Symantec sub-CAs now under DigiCert's operational control), the past precedent (e.g. the gradual distrust of WoSign/StartCom through whitelists, of CNNIC through whitelists), and the public discussion involved so entirely that it's entirely unfounded. So I think your continued suggestion that it's being discarded so readily is, again, misleading and inaccurate.
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