Having received no further comments, I am recommending approval of Hongkong
Post's inclusion request.

As Matt suggested earlier in this thread, I would not typically approve a
request for a CA with an open compliance bug, but in this case the bug is
open awaiting implementation of pre-issuance linting, something that is not
required by our policy. Hongkong Post states that they have implemented
post-issuance linting and expect their CA system vendor to support
pre-issuance linting within a few months.

- Wayne

On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 11:35 AM Wayne Thayer <wtha...@mozilla.com> wrote:

> I have confirmed that the problems identified with the CPS have been
> corrected. [1]
>
> Regarding the comments from Ian on the BR violations in 2016 that resulted
> in adding an intermediate to OneCRL [2], this appears to have been the
> result of the belief that was held by many CAs at that time that only
> certificates "intended" to be used for serverAuth were subject to BR
> requirements. That doesn't excuse the very serious threat that was posed by
> Hongkong Post's issuance of SHA-1 certificates with sequential serial
> numbers that were valid for serverAuth.
>
> Hongkong Post has provided an incident report and answered follow-up
> questions in the bug [3] documenting the failure to report misissued
> certificates. Hongkong Post states that they are currently performing
> post-issuance linting on a monthly basis. They plan to implement
> pre-issuance linting as soon as their CA software vendor supports it. The
> bug will remain open until that is completed.
>
> I would like to make a decision next week on how to proceed with this
> request. Please post any additional comments or concerns by Wednesday
> 20-February.
>
> - Wayne
>
> [1] https://www.ecert.gov.hk/product/cps/ecert/img/server_cps_en4.pdf
> [2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1267332
> [3] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1520299
>
>
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