On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 11:16 PM Jaime Hablutzel via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> So I would like to ask again if there is any possibility to implement some > type of exceptions handling as asked in [2]. > This has been repeatedly and unambiguously answered: categorically, the answer is no. The analysis and discussion so far is not only demonstrative of what CAs COULD have done, but what CAs SHOULD have done. If one imagines generating 2^64 certificates, they might pick serials of 2^128 bits of entropy. It has been repeatedly addressed, for years, in this forum that exceptions are not granted, and are fundamentally detrimental to the goals of a transparent and equitable set of expectations for CAs. There's no need to relitigate that, nor is it appropriate, considering that every matter of CA non-compliance seems to invoke the same conversation. CAs are ultimately responsible for their compliance and for their actions following non-compliance. The revocation policy has been repeatedly clarified, both individually and generally, as to the expectations. It's a mistake to conflate non-compliance as a guaranteed removal, just as it's a mistake to conflate (seeming) compliance with guaranteed inclusion. Trust is not guaranteed - it's earned, by demonstration of awareness, knowledge, and responsive handling of issues that demonstrate a holistic understanding of the issues and risks and a reasonable and consistent responsiveness. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
