Jeremy: do you consider the fact that DigiCert signed certs without proof of private key possession to have been a violation if its CPS?
On Fri, Apr 12, 2019 at 10:04 AM Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com> wrote: > The net result were some people created private certs with our root cert > public key. We signed new certs using that public key after verifying > domain control. We saw the process happen a few times but didn't worry > about it too much as the requesters didn't control the private key. We > ended up shutting off the no-CSR path because we figured the issuance of > these certs created a potential PR concern, even if there isn't a real > security risk. > > -----Original Message----- > From: dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org> > On Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy > Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 10:56 AM > To: Wayne Thayer <wtha...@mozilla.com>; Jakob Bohm <jb-mozi...@wisemo.com> > Cc: mozilla-dev-security-policy < > mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org> > Subject: RE: Arabtec Holding public key? [Weird Digicert issued cert] > > I don't mind filling in details. > > We have a system that permits creation of certificates without a CSR that > works by extracting the key from an existing cert, validating the > domain/org information, and creating a new certificate based on the > contents of the old certificate. The system was supposed to do a handshake > with a server hosting the existing certificate as a form of checking > control over the private key, but that was never implemented, slated for a > phase 2 that never came. We've since disabled that system, although we > didn't file any incident report (for the reasons discussed so far). > > -----Original Message----- > From: dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org> > On Behalf Of Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy > Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 10:39 AM > To: Jakob Bohm <jb-mozi...@wisemo.com> > Cc: mozilla-dev-security-policy < > mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org> > Subject: Re: Arabtec Holding public key? [Weird Digicert issued cert] > > It's not clear that there is anything for DigiCert to respond to. Are we > asserting that the existence of this Arabtec certificate is proof that > DigiCert violated section 3.2.1 of their CPS? > > - Wayne > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 6:57 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > > On 11/04/2019 04:47, Santhan Raj wrote: > > > On Wednesday, April 10, 2019 at 5:53:45 PM UTC-7, Corey Bonnell wrote: > > >> On Wednesday, April 10, 2019 at 7:41:33 PM UTC-4, Nick Lamb wrote: > > >>> (Resending after I typo'd the ML address) > > >>> > > >>> At the risk of further embarrassing myself in the same week, while > > >>> working further on mimicking Firefox trust decisions I found this > > >>> pre-certificate for Arabtec Holding PJSC: > > >>> > > >>> https://crt.sh/?id=926433948 > > >>> > > >>> Now there's nothing especially strange about this certificate, > > >>> except that its RSA public key is shared with several other > > >>> certificates > > >>> > > >>> > > https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8bb593a93be1d0e8a822bb887c547890c3e706aad2d > > ab76254f97fb36b82fc26 > > >>> > > >>> ... such as the DigiCert Global Root G2: > > >>> > > >>> https://crt.sh/?caid=5885 > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> I would like to understand what happened here. Maybe I have once > > >>> again made a terrible mistake, but if not surely this means either > > >>> that the Issuing authority was fooled into issuing for a key the > > >>> subscriber doesn't actually have or worse, this Arabtec Holding > > >>> outfit has the private keys for DigiCert's Global Root G2 > > >>> > > >>> Nick. > > >> > > >> AFAIK there's no requirement in the BRs or Mozilla Root Policy for > > >> CAs > > to actually verify that the Applicant actually is in possession of the > > corresponding private key for public keys included in CSRs (i.e., > > check the signature on the CSR), so the most likely explanation is > > that the CA in question did not check the signature on the > > Applicant-submitted CSR and summarily embedded the supplied public key > > in the certificate (assuming Digicert's CA infrastructure wasn't > > compromised, but I think that's highly unlikely). > > >> > > >> A very similar situation was brought up on the list before, but > > >> with > > WoSign as the issuing CA: > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/zECd9J3KBW > > 8/OlK44lmGCAAJ > > >> > > > > > > While not a BR requirement, the CA's CPS does stipulate validating > > possession of private key in section 3.2.1 (looking at the change > > history, it appears this stipulation existed during the cert > > issuance). So something else must have happened here. > > > > > > Except for the Arabtec cert, the other certs looks like cross-sign > > > for > > the Digicert root. > > > > > > > Why still no response from Digicert? Has this been reported to them > > directly? > > > > > > > > Enjoy > > > > Jakob > > -- > > Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com > > Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 This > > public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. > > WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded > > _______________________________________________ > > dev-security-policy mailing list > > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org > > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > > > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
