On Tuesday, June 11, 2019 at 2:49:31 PM UTC+3, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> We wanted to experiment a bit with logotype extensions and trademarks, but
> we heard from the CAB Forum that whether inclusion is allowed is subject a
> bit to interpretation by the browsers.
> 
>  
> 
> >From the BRs section 7.1.2.4
> 
> "All other fields and extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280.
> The CA SHALL NOT issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage flag,
> extendedKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not specified
> in section 7.1.2.1, 7.1.2.2, or 7.1.2.3 unless the CA is aware of a reason
> for including the data in the Certificate. CAs SHALL NOT issue a Certificate
> with: a. Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet
> (such as an extendedKeyUsage value for a service that is only valid in the
> context of a privately managed network), unless: i. such value falls within
> an OID arc for which the Applicant demonstrates ownership, or ii. the
> Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data in a public
> context; or b. semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party
> about the certificate information verified by the CA (such as including
> extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to verify
> that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due to
> remote issuance)."
> 
>  
> 
> In this case, the logotype extension would have a trademark included (or
> link to a trademark). I think this allowed as:
> 
> 1.    There is a reason for including the data in the Certificate (to
> identify a verified trademark). Although you may disagree about the reason
> for needing this information, there is a not small number of people
> interested in figuring out how to better use identification information. No
> browser would be required to use the information (of course), but it would
> give organizations another way to manage certificates and identity
> information - one that is better (imo) than org information.
> 2.    The cert applies in the context of the public Internet.
> Trademarks/identity information is already included in the BRs. 
> 3.    The trademark does not falls within an OID arc for which the
> Applicant demonstrates ownership (no OID included).
> 4.    The Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data
> in a public context. If we vet ownership of the trademark with the
> appropriate office, there's no conflict there.
> 5.    Semantics that, if included, will not mislead a Relying Party about
> the certificate information verified by the CA (such as including
> extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to verify
> that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware due to
> remote issuance). None of these examples are very close to the proposal.
> 
>  
> 
> What I'm looking for is not a discussion on whether this is a good idea, but
> rather  is it currently permitted under the BRs per Mozilla's
> interpretation. I'd like to have the "is this a good idea" discussion, but
> in a separate thread to avoid conflating permitted action compared to ideal
> action.
> 
>  
> 
> Jeremy

Sorry – the USPTO links for the Subway registered trademarks in my last message 
expired.  Go to this search page

http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchss&state=4808:d53jqt.1.1

And search on these two Serial or Registration Numbers to see the Subway logo 
and word mark:
5373029
5601308
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