Issue description:
Misissuing of two leaf certificates because of incorrect postcode. 
For the certificates listed below, the postalCode= contained '1260 Nyon' 
instead of ‘1260’ only.

This is an incident report for the issue above according to 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Responding_To_An_Incident#Incident_Report

1. How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a problem report 
submitted to your Problem Reporting Mechanism, a discussion in 
mozilla.dev.security.policy, a Bugzilla bug, or internal self-audit), and the 
time and date.

On 25 July 2019 during an internal review as a preparation for a new product we 
became aware of the issue described above.


2. A timeline of the actions your CA took in response. A timeline is a 
date-and-time-stamped sequence of all relevant events. This may include events 
before the incident was reported, such as when a particular requirement became 
applicable, or a document changed, or a bug was introduced, or an audit was 
done.

Timeline of incident handling
a. July 25, 2019 (09:05 AM): A SwissSign employee detected as part of an 
internal review a possible issue. He discussed the finding with his colleagues 
and contacted the internal Information Security group (InfSec)

b. July 25, 2019 (11:30 AM) SwissSign InfSec started the internal incident 
management process

c. July 25, 2019 (11:35 AM) SwissSign starts the root cause analysis to gather 
data for this incident report

d. July 04, 2019 (11:50 AM) First certificate (https://crt.sh/?id=1638896764) 
revocation by customers operator

e. July 26, 2019 (02:35 PM): Second certificate detected in internal review. 
Request initiated that MPI operator revokes second certificate 
(https://crt.sh/?id=1639098392)

f. July 29, 2019 (06:00 PM): SwissSign publishes this incident report on 
Bugzilla and mozilla.dev.security.policy

g. July 30, 2019 (EOD): Second certificate (https://crt.sh/?id=1639098392) 
revocation


3. Whether your CA has stopped, or has not yet stopped, issuing certificates 
with the problem. A statement that you have will be considered a pledge to the 
community; a statement that you have not requires an explanation.

These erroneous certificates were issued on July 04, 2019. We have stopped 
issuing certificates with the problem by July 25, 2019. No certificates were 
issued expect these two in the period of the error.
Certificate https://crt.sh/?id=1638896764 has been revoked and 
https://crt.sh/?id=1639098392 will be revoked until 30.07.2019. 


4. A summary of the problematic certificates. For each problem: number of 
certs, and the date the first and last certs with that problem were issued.

Only 2 certificate are affected. The certificates were issued on July 04, 2019.


5. The complete certificate data for the problematic certificates. The 
recommended way to provide this is to ensure each certificate is logged to CT 
and then list the fingerprints or crt.sh IDs, either in the report or as an 
attached spreadsheet, with one list per distinct problem.

Under the SwissSign EV Gold CA 2014 - G22 Issuing CA the following leaf 
certificates 
https://crt.sh/?id=1638896764 
https://crt.sh/?id=1639098392 


6. Explanation about how and why the mistakes were made or bugs introduced, and 
how they avoided detection until now.

The mask in the operator template for this specific managed PKI for one 
specific operator was set up wrongly and concatenated the fields for postal 
code and location into the postalcode field of the certificate.
The wrong configuration was based on human error. The mask has been configured 
by an exception process which we discontinued as of July 25, 2019.


7. List of steps your CA is taking to resolve the situation and ensure such 
issuance will not be repeated in the future, accompanied with a timeline of 
when your CA expects to accomplish these things.

Exception process has been discontinued.

The text above is additionally posted at Bugzilla: 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1569651
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