On Monday, November 25, 2019 at 5:32:12 PM UTC-8, Apple CA wrote:
> On Saturday, November 23, 2019 at 3:28:10 PM UTC-8, Matt Palmer wrote:
> > [aside: this is how incident reports should be done, IMHO]
> > 
> > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 07:23:27PM -0800, Apple CA via dev-security-policy 
> > wrote:
> > > We did not have an accurate understanding of how the vulnerability scanner
> > > worked.  Our understanding of its capabilities lead us to believe it was
> > > scanning and detecting vulnerabilities in EJBCA.
> > 
> > There's a reasonable chance that other CAs may have a similar situation, so
> > I think it's worth digging deeper into the root causes here.  Can you expand
> > on how this misunderstanding regarding the vulnerability scanner came to
> > pass?  What was the information on which you were relying when you came to
> > the understanding of the vulnerability scanner's capabilities?  Were you
> > misled by the vendor marketing or technical documentation, or was it an
> > Apple-internal assessment that came to an inaccurate conclution?  Or
> > "other"?
> > 
> > - Matt
> Thank you for your questions.  Due to the Thanksgiving holiday in the US, we 
> expect to reply to your questions as early as the week of 02 December.

In order to identify vulnerabilities, the vulnerability scanner (1) attempts to 
identify/profile software listening on ports and (2) compares software versions 
against public CVEs and proprietary data sources. EJBCA is not broadly used 
software, and the vulnerability scanner did not have custom EJBCA detection 
logic. Upon our deeper investigation, we discovered that it (1) only scans the 
HTTP service and not the EJBCA software, which we would consider insufficient 
on its own and (2) is not as effective at flagging vulnerabilities in EJBCA 
because CVEs are not published by EJBCA. We don’t feel we were mislead by the 
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