On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 01:23:49AM -0400, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 10:04 PM Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> > 1. Make cPSuri mandatory
> 
> We really don’t need to be stuffing everything into subscriber
> certificates, especially when it’s relevant to who the issuer is. We also
> need to make sure we are optimizing for the right case - the vast majority
> of certificates who, for their entire lifetime, have no need to express the
> CPS URI, and would waste countless bytes (and electrons and fossil fuel)
> unnecessarily.

That ship sailed so very, very long ago, though.  Practically every
certificate out there already provides a (far less useful) cPSuri, and many
certificates are also jammed full of all sorts of other cruft, like Explicit
Text.

> 2. Make the cPSuri actually point to the relevant CPS
> 
> That doesn’t really capture what a CPS is. There can be many relevant CPSes
> to a single certificate, both for a single path and multiple paths. That’s
> literally how audits came to be - to support the model of multiple CPSes.

>From what I can see in a CSV o' Doom, a CA can only provide a single CPS
link for a given intermediate.  That does rather suggest that there's only
one CPS for a given certificate.

> The problem is that a CA's repository, or "online information provided by
> > the CA", typically looks something like this:
> >
> >  * CPS for Device PKI
> >  * Frambingaling CP and CPS v2.1
> >  * Latest Certificate Practice Statement for Small Furry Creatures
> >  * Subscriber Agreement and Addendum for Something Something
> >
> > ... and so on.  How I get from "I have a certificate that I need to
> > report",
> > which contains an issuer CN and not much else, to the correct document out
> > of that list above, is a non-trivial problem.  Having the cPSuri point *to
> > the CPS* would completely solve that.
> 
> Do you disagree? If Mozilla Policy made normative that there be some form
> of binding problem reporting statement for each issuer certificate, would
> that address your problem or not?

Not particularly, because while problem reporting addresses are the major
part of why I have gone looking for CPSes in the recent past, it is not the
only reason.

- Matt

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