On Sat, Nov 14, 2020 at 2:05 PM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > So, perhaps now that we've had this conversation, and you've learned about > potentially illegitimate revocations are a thing, but that they were not > the thing I was worrying about and that you'd misunderstood, perhaps we can > move back to the substantive discussion?
Going back to earlier posts, it seems like CAs could include a statement in their CPS separate from key compromise that they may revoke a certificate at any time for any reason or no reason at their sole discretion. That would allow the CA to choose to accept proofs of key compromise that are not listed in the CPS based on their internal risk methodologies, correct? It does still have the "secret document" issue, but moves it away from key compromise and makes it clear and transparent to subscribers and relying parties. This means the CA could revoke the subscriber certificate because they have an internal procedure that they roll a bunch of D16 and revoke any certificate with a serial number that matches the result. Or the CA could revoke the certificate because they got a claim that the key in the certificate is compromised but it came in a form not explicitly called out, so they had to use their own judgement on whether to revoke. Thanks, Peter _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
