(Writing in a Google capacity) I personally want to say thanks to everyone who has contributed to this discussion, who have reviewed or reported past incidents, and who have continued to provide valuable feedback on current incidents. When considering CAs and incidents, we really want to ensure we’re considering all relevant information, as well as making sure we’ve got a correct understanding of the details.
After full consideration of the information available, and in order to protect and safeguard Chrome users, certificates issued by AC Camerfirma SA will no longer be accepted in Chrome, beginning with Chrome 90. This will be implemented via our existing mechanisms to respond to CA incidents, via an integrated blocklist. Beginning with Chrome 90, users that attempt to navigate to a website that uses a certificate that chains to one of the roots detailed below will find that it is not considered secure, with a message indicating that it has been revoked. Users and enterprise administrators will not be able to bypass or override this warning. This change will be integrated into the Chromium open-source project as part of a default build. Questions about the expected behavior in specific Chromium-based browsers should be directed to their maintainers. To ensure sufficient time for testing and for the replacement of affected certificates by website operators, this change will be incorporated as part of the regular Chrome release process. Information about timetables and milestones is available at https://chromiumdash.appspot.com/schedule. Beginning approximately the week of Thursday, March 11, 2021, website operators will be able to preview these changes in Chrome 90 Beta. Website operators will also be able to preview the change sooner, using our Dev and Canary channels, while the majority of users will not encounter issues until the release of Chrome 90 to the Stable channel, currently targeting the week of Tuesday, April 13, 2021. When responding to CA incidents in the past, there have been a variety of approaches taken by different browser vendors, determined both by the facts of the incident and the technical options available to the browsers. Our particular decision to actively block all certificates, old and new alike, is based on consideration of the details available, the present technical implementation, and a desire to have a consistent, predictable, cross-platform experience for Chrome users and site operators. For the list of affected root certificates, please see below. Note that we have included a holistic set of root certificates in order to ensure consistency across the various platforms Chrome supports, even when they may not be intended for TLS usage. However, please note that the restrictions are placed on the associated subjectPublicKeyInfo fields of these certificates. Affected Certificates (SHA-256 fingerprint) - 04F1BEC36951BC1454A904CE32890C5DA3CDE1356B7900F6E62DFA2041EBAD51 - 063E4AFAC491DFD332F3089B8542E94617D893D7FE944E10A7937EE29D9693C0 - 0C258A12A5674AEF25F28BA7DCFAECEEA348E541E6F5CC4EE63B71B361606AC3 - C1D80CE474A51128B77E794A98AA2D62A0225DA3F419E5C7ED73DFBF660E7109 - 136335439334A7698016A0D324DE72284E079D7B5220BB8FBD747816EEBEBACA - EF3CB417FC8EBF6F97876C9E4ECE39DE1EA5FE649141D1028B7D11C0B2298CED On Thu, Dec 3, 2020 at 1:01 PM Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > All, > > We have prepared an issues list as a summary of Camerfirma's compliance > issues over the past several years. The purpose of the list is to collect > and document all issues and responses in one place so that an overall > picture can be seen by the community. The document is on the Mozilla wiki: > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Camerfirma_Issues. > <https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Camerfirma_Issues> > > I will now forward the link above to Camerfirma to provide them with a > proper opportunity to respond to the issues raised and to ask that they > respond directly in m.d.s.p. with any comments, corrections, inputs, or > updates that they may have. > > If anyone in this group believes they have an issue appropriate to add to > the list, please send an email to certifica...@mozilla.org. > > Sincerely yours, > Ben Wilson > Mozilla Root Program > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
