All, GlobalSign has provided a very detailed incident report in Bugzilla - see https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1690807#c2. There are a few remaining questions that still need to be answered, so this email is just to keep you aware. Hopefully later this week I'll be able to come back and see if people are satisfied and whether we can proceed with the root inclusion request. Sincerely, Ben
On Fri, Feb 5, 2021 at 2:36 PM Ben Wilson <bwil...@mozilla.com> wrote: > All, > Under Step 10 of the https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Application_Process, > this is notice of a "further question or concern" that has > arisen concerning GlobalSign's issuance of a 1024-bit RSA certificate. See > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1690807. GlobalSign has > indicated that it will provide an incident report by next Tuesday, > 9-Feb-2021. > Thanks, > Ben > > On Tue, Feb 2, 2021 at 5:48 PM Ben Wilson <bwil...@mozilla.com> wrote: > >> On January 11, 2021, we began the public discussion period [Step 4 of the >> Mozilla Root Store CA Application Process >> <https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Application_Process>] for the >> above-referenced GlobalSign inclusion request. >> >> *Summary of Discussion and Completion of Action Items [Steps 5-8]:* >> >> Recently, Ryan Sleevi noted that GlobalSign is transitioning to a better >> Root CA hierarchy with single-purpose roots. This will lead to less risk >> due to fewer cross-dependencies from other uses of PKI. He also noted that >> GlobalSign has improved the quality of its incident reporting and >> remediation. I agree on both of these points. >> >> While GlobalSign currently has six matters open in Bugzilla, none of >> these should be a reason to delay approval of this inclusion request. >> >> 1591005 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1591005> – the >> relevant issuing CAs have been revoked (nearly closed, waiting on a final >> key destruction report) >> >> 1649937 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1649937> - >> Incorrect OCSP Delegated Responder Certificate issue - GlobalSign ceased >> including the OCSP signing EKU in any newly generated issuing CA >> (approximately 10 remaining issuing CAs affected by issue are on schedule >> to be revoked) >> >> 1651447 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1651447> – Delayed >> CA revocation, per issue # 1649937 above (GlobalSign is switching over from >> old to newer infrastructure, as described in this and other bugs) >> >> 1664328 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1664328> - SHA-256 >> hash algorithm used with ECC P-384 key (almost closed, status update needed) >> >> 1667944 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1667944> – Empty >> SingleExtension in OCSP responses (migration to new OCSP responders nearly >> completed) >> >> 1668007 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1668007> – Country >> name in stateOrProvinceName field (almost closed, status update needed) >> >> This is notice that I am closing public discussion [Step 9] and that it >> is Mozilla’s intent to approve GlobalSign's request for inclusion [Step >> 10]. >> >> This begins a 7-day “last call” period for any final objections. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Ben >> >> On Mon, Feb 1, 2021 at 10:18 AM Ben Wilson <bwil...@mozilla.com> wrote: >> >>> This is a reminder that I will close discussion on this tomorrow. >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2021 at 5:59 PM Ben Wilson <bwil...@mozilla.com> wrote: >>> >>>> This is to announce the beginning of the public discussion phase of the >>>> Mozilla root CA inclusion process for GlobalSign. >>>> >>>> See https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Application_Process#Process_Overview, >>>> (Steps 4 through 9). >>>> >>>> GlobalSign has four (4) new roots to include in the root store. Two >>>> roots, one RSA and another ECC, are to support server authentication >>>> (Bugzilla Bug # 1570724 >>>> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1570724>) while two >>>> other roots are for email authentication, RSA and ECC (Bugzilla Bug # >>>> 1637269 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1637269>). >>>> >>>> Mozilla is considering approving GlobalSign’s request(s). This email >>>> begins the 3-week comment period, after which, if no concerns are raised, >>>> we will close the discussion and the request may proceed to the approval >>>> phase (Step 10). >>>> >>>> *A Summary of Information Gathered and Verified appears here in these >>>> two CCADB cases:* >>>> >>>> >>>> https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/PrintViewForCase?CaseNumber=00000469 >>>> >>>> >>>> https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/PrintViewForCase?CaseNumber=00000596 >>>> >>>> *Root Certificate Information:* >>>> >>>> *GlobalSign Root R46 * >>>> >>>> crt.sh - >>>> https://crt.sh/?q=4FA3126D8D3A11D1C4855A4F807CBAD6CF919D3A5A88B03BEA2C6372D93C40C9 >>>> >>>> Download - https://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/rootr46.crt >>>> >>>> *GlobalSign Root E46* >>>> >>>> crt.sh - >>>> https://crt.sh/?q=CBB9C44D84B8043E1050EA31A69F514955D7BFD2E2C6B49301019AD61D9F5058 >>>> >>>> Download - https://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/roote46.crt >>>> >>>> *GlobalSign Secure Mail Root R45 * >>>> >>>> crt.sh - >>>> https://crt.sh/?q=319AF0A7729E6F89269C131EA6A3A16FCD86389FDCAB3C47A4A675C161A3F974 >>>> >>>> Download - https://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/smimerootr45.crt >>>> >>>> *GlobalSign Secure Mail Root E45 * >>>> >>>> crt.sh - >>>> https://crt.sh/?q=5CBF6FB81FD417EA4128CD6F8172A3C9402094F74AB2ED3A06B4405D04F30B19 >>>> >>>> Download - https://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/smimeroote45.crt >>>> >>>> >>>> *CP/CPS:* >>>> >>>> https://www.globalsign.com/en/repository/GlobalSign_CPS_v9.6_final.pdf >>>> >>>> The current GlobalSign CPS is version 9.6, published 29-December-2020. >>>> >>>> Repository location: https://www.globalsign.com/en/repository >>>> >>>> *BR Self-Assessment* (Excel) is located here: >>>> >>>> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=9082310 >>>> >>>> *Audits:* GlobalSign is audited annually in accordance with the >>>> WebTrust criteria by Ernst & Young, Belgium, which found in June 2020 that >>>> “throughout the period April 1, 2019 to March 31, 2020, GlobalSign >>>> management’s assertion, as referred to above, is fairly stated, in all >>>> material respects, in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria >>>> for Certification Authorities - SSL Baseline with Network Security, Version >>>> 2.3.” The WebTrust audit noted the following 13 Bugzilla incidents, >>>> which had been previously reported as of that audit date: >>>> >>>> 1 Misissuance of QWAC certificates. >>>> >>>> 2 Issue with an OCSP responder status. >>>> >>>> 3 Some SSL certificates with US country code and invalid State/Prov >>>> have been issued. >>>> >>>> 4 ICAs in CCADB, without EKU extension are listed in WTCA report but >>>> not in WTBR report. >>>> >>>> 5 OCSP responders found to respond signed by the default CA when passed >>>> an invalid issuer in request. >>>> >>>> 6 Wrong business category on 3 EV SSL certificates. >>>> >>>> 7 OCSP Responder returned invalid values for some precertificates. >>>> >>>> 8 Customer running an on-premise (technically-constrained) CA that >>>> chains to a GlobalSign root, issued certificates without AIA extension. >>>> >>>> 9 Misissued 4 certificates with invalid CN. >>>> >>>> 10 Certificates with Subject Public Key Info lacking the explicit NULL >>>> parameter. >>>> >>>> 11 Untimely revocation of TLS certificate after submission of private >>>> key compromise. >>>> >>>> 12 Unable to revoke 2 noncompliant QWACs within 5 days. >>>> >>>> 13 Unable to revoke noncompliant ICA within 7 days >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *Incident Reports / Mis-Issuances * >>>> >>>> The following bugs/incidents remain open and are being worked on. >>>> >>>> 1667944 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1667944> >>>> >>>> Empty SingleExtension in OCSP responses >>>> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1667944> >>>> >>>> 1651447 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1651447> >>>> >>>> Failure to revoke noncompliant ICA within 7 days >>>> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1651447> >>>> >>>> 1591005 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1591005> >>>> >>>> ICAs in CCADB, without EKU extension are listed in WTCA report but not >>>> in WTBR report <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1591005> >>>> >>>> 1649937 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1649937> >>>> >>>> Incorrect OCSP Delegated Responder Certificate >>>> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1649937> >>>> >>>> 1668007 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1668007> >>>> >>>> Invalid stateOrProvinceName value >>>> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1668007> >>>> >>>> 1664328 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1664328> >>>> >>>> SHA-256 hash algorithm used with ECC P-384 key >>>> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1664328> >>>> >>>> 1575880 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1575880> >>>> >>>> SSL Certificates with US country code and invalid State/Prov >>>> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1575880> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> No misissuances were found under these roots, and the CA certificates >>>> passed technical tests. >>>> >>>> Thus, this email begins a three-week public discussion period, which >>>> I’m scheduling to close on or about Tuesday, 2-February-2021. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Sincerely yours, >>>> >>>> Ben Wilson >>>> >>>> Mozilla Root Program >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
