Thanks Cynthia,Sorry, I'm not familiar with your investigation procedure, once its clear, I'll be happy to participate, if invited.In the meantime:"there is still no proof being provided or any claims that are specific enough for me toverify."Specifi claims: millions of QSCDs in QESCs in circulation today.As for proof, I'll be happy to participate in any formal investigation."Also I still don't get how what you are talking about is the "EUcentric perspective", not to mention that of course this is going to be an EU centric discussion as it is EU legislation/regulation."And you are right, surrogate QSCDs and QESCs were post factum legitimizied "nationally" despite of their direct competition with Directive 1999/93/EC, eIDAS and other relevant legislation. So the cartel buys whatever national legislation needed with the presumption that "nobody cares"."And most important of all is I don't see how this has anything to do with the topic for this thread (securityriskahead.eu/QWACs).Does this have anything to do with Mozilla's campaign or QWACs?"Depends what you mean by security, if surrogate QSCD/QESC are secure, of course QWACs also should be secure.Hope this helps.Thanks,M.D.Sent from my Galaxy -------- Original message --------From: Cynthia Revström <[email protected]> Date: 7/15/22 21:46 (GMT+02:00) To: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <[email protected]> Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]>, "Enrico E." <[email protected]>, [email protected], "[email protected]" <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Mozilla Campaign: securityriskahead.eu Sorry, this doesn't really clarify anything at all, there is still noproof being provided or any claims that are specific enough for me toverify.Also I still don't get how what you are talking about is the "EUcentric perspective", not to mention that of course this is going tobe an EU centric discussion as it is EU legislation/regulation.And most important of all is I don't see how this has anything to dowith the topic for this thread (securityriskahead.eu/QWACs).Does this have anything to do with Mozilla's campaign or QWACs?-CynthiaOn Fri, Jul 15, 2022 at 8:36 PM Moudrick M. Dadashov <[email protected]> wrote:>> Thanks Cynthia,>> Let me shortly answer your question "> I really do not understand what your point is here, who are the> "ORGANIZED GROUP" and what kind of relationship are you suggesting> that there is between SEB/Swedbank and Telia?">> Firstly, today we have millions of surrogate QSCDs and QESCs in circulation issued issued (provisioned) by a TSP fully owned by the Swedish cartel mentioned in my email.>> ORGANIZED GROUP means those surrogate QSCDs and QESCs have been delibarately promoted and supported by the corruption infrastructure under control of this cartel. This is the reason why any attempts to initiate appropriate administrative procedure are blocked by "interested parties".>> Hope this clarifies how EU centric perspective functions in reality.>> Thanks,> M.D.>>> Sent from my Galaxy>>> -------- Original message --------> From: "'Cynthia Revström' via [email protected]" <[email protected]>> Date: 7/15/22 20:55 (GMT+02:00)> To: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <[email protected]>> Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]>, "Enrico E." <[email protected]>, [email protected], "[email protected]" <[email protected]>> Subject: Re: Mozilla Campaign: securityriskahead.eu>> Hi Moudrick,>> I really do not understand what your point is here, who are the> "ORGANIZED GROUP" and what kind of relationship are you suggesting> that there is between SEB/Swedbank and Telia?> You are making very vague claims here that I can't even begin to try to verify.>> The only real thing I can immediately think of is that they are all> big Swedish companies who are also active in the baltic countries, but> that doesn't mean much on its own.>> Yes both SEB and Swedbank have had money laundering issues but I don't> see how that is related to Telia or eIDAS or what this cartel would> be.>> -Cynthia>> On Fri, Jul 15, 2022 at 1:00 PM 'Moudrick M. Dadashov' via> [email protected] <[email protected]>> wrote:> >> > Good day, Phillip> >> > If we notice "US-centric" perspective, we should also notice EU-centric perspective that relies on unelected, unaccountable public sector bodies doing "supervisory body business" under patronage of pan-European corporations.> >> > To be more specific let me remind you millions of surrogate QSCDs and QESCs in circulation today - the product of corruption network led by the Swedish telco-banking cartel - the semi-state Telia Company AB (aka corruption academy) and two well known laundromats - Swedbank and SEB.> >> > BTW, the ORGANIZED GROUP has its own embassy in Brussels.> >> > I wish someone from mr. Norbert Sagstetter’s team could join the discussion.> >> > Thanks,> > M.D.> >> >> > Sent from my Galaxy> >> >> > -------- Original message --------> > From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]>> > Date: 7/15/22 13:32 (GMT+02:00)> > To: "Enrico E." <[email protected]>> > Cc: [email protected], "[email protected]" <[email protected]>> > Subject: Re: Mozilla Campaign: securityriskahead.eu> >> > I don't necessarily disagree with the argument being made there. But I think it would be best if all three parties (Government, Browser Providers, CAs) moved past the original framing of 'Should Google or Government decide who you trust' because it is the wrong question:> >> > The user should decide who to trust.> >> > As we have seen, Google has unilaterally exercised its ability to drop roots out of its store effectively forcing CAs to shut down or be transferred to other operators. Mozilla might think it has a dog in this fight but it is not really Mozilla that is the target of the very real national security concerns that have been raised.> >> > Looking at those concerns from a US-centric silicon valley libertarian perspective is probably not helpful when the decision makers here are Europeans and their elected representatives.> >> >> >> > On Fri, Jul 15, 2022 at 8:29 AM Enrico E. <[email protected]> wrote:> >>> >> Dear all,> >>> >> I would like to bring in a different view on the whole topic. In April this year this article https://rdcu.be/cJQpU on Qualified Certificates for Website Authentication (QWAC) was published in the journal Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (data protection and data security) . We explained why QWACs can help to protect the user in European Union, why the QWAC is an important feature of the security of the digital infrastructure in the EU, and why the new proposal of the commission is a step in the right direction. In the article, there are preliminary suggestions for how to implement the new article 45 proposal.> >>> >> Thanks,> >>> >> Enrico> >>> >>> >> [email protected] schrieb am Donnerstag, 14. Juli 2022 um 14:30:17 UTC+2:> >>>> >>> As with the Google response, you are taking a very US-centric approach to lobbying that is only going to reduce the chance of influencing the outcome. EU politics are not the same as US politics.> >>>> >>> Case in point, the site isn't translated into German, French or Spanish. There aren't very many English speakers left in the EU after Brexit.> >>>> >>> Unlike US politicians who are mostly self important numbskulls, most MEPs are very serious people. These are (mostly) the politicians who have complete command of their briefs. They are not going to be convinced by the argument that QWACs represent a threat to the security of the Internet while LetsEncrypt's free certificates with no validation whatsoever are just peachy because that is a really bad argument to try to make.> >>>> >>> The EU concern here is that Google is setting itself up to be the monopoly provider of trust in the Web and that eliminating EV certs is a part of that strategy. If you want to influence the outcome of this issue, you need to provide them with an alternative approach to achieving that end. I will explain how to do that at the end, first I have to explain my point of view.> >>>> >>>> >>> The heart of VeriSign Class 3 and the Extended Validation requirements was establishing the accountability of the subject. It was never about identity. The notion was that if someone is going to be engaged in criminal activity, they would only do so as long as it was profitable. Creating one fake corporate identity is simple, creating disposable identities is deliberately hard. Knowing that you are doing business with a company registered in the US has different risks to one registered in the UK or in Germany and the risks of dealing with a company registered in Nigeria or Russia are very different again.> >>>> >>> VeriSign Class 3 and EV both outperformed my expectations. They weren't perfect but security is the management of risk, not risk elimination. Neither Firefox nor Chrome is free from sin either and writing code without security vulnerabilities is a task that is entirely within the scope of the developers while providing the interface between the online world and the offline world is not.> >>>> >>>> >>> At this point the WebPKI and TLS are over 25 years old and they are the only parts of the Web security infrastructure that actually deliver. The only other Internet security protocol that is close to being a home run is SSH and that is really just SSL for Telnet.> >>>> >>> Rather than constantly attacking the only parts of the system that are functional, we would do a lot better to look at how Internet security is failing. The big problem of Web Security is Phishing and that is a problem because we still rely on passwords and the way we make use of passwords is the worst possible way.> >>>> >>> The original security goal for the WebPKI was to make shopping online as secure as shopping in bricks and mortar stores. That was all. Online brokerages, banks were not part of it: We only had 40 bit encryption because of the export controls. The whole issue was persuading Visa and Mastercard to let merchants use the Web.> >>>> >>> What we missed (well I did at least) was the fact that 95% of Web activity doesn't involve payments and never will (sorry Web3 people). So the WebPKI was overbuilt for 95% of Web sites. But we didn't notice that at first because doing RSA1024 was such a drag on the server that the only people using SSL were the people who really, really needed it.> >>>> >>> So now we have a situation where the needs of the 95% of sites that only need lightweight encryption with minimal endpoint authentication are driving the whole show. The WebPKI designed by Michael Baum and Warwick Ford has been more or less dismantled.> >>>> >>> Rather than going back, I think we should go forward. The WebPKI was a technology of its day. We were working with limited machines and limited technology. We only ever made authenticating the bank to the customer work, TLS Client auth has never been practical because of the achilles heel of PUBLIC Key Cryptography - we punted on the critical task of managing the private key. And now that the user has dozens of devices, that is a critical problem. Fido overcomes some of the issues of TLS-CA but not the key management one.> >>>> >>> I have been telling people that Threshold Key cryptography is the way to address this issue for six years now. First they said go away and write a draft, so I did that. And then they said go away and write code, so I did that. And then they said write an application that uses the code, so I did that.> >>>> >>> What I want to do now is to take a look at that code and see if we could use these ideas in existing Web browsers.> >>>> >>>> >>> My model of the Web is different. In my model, the goal is to put the user in control. So coming back to QWACs, the decision to use QWACs should lie with the user and the user alone. It is not for the browser provider to make that decision. Same for any root store inclusion: it is a user decision.> >>>> >>> Now of course, very few users have the ability to make such decisions themselves and the few of us who do do not have the time. So the real issue is that the user should have the ability to delegate that choice to the trust provider of their choice.> >>>> >>> In my view, curating CA roots belongs with Anti-Virus, DNS resolution as a personal trust service. When a user acquires a new device, they connect it to their personal account which in turn connects to their chosen trust service provider. The user should have the ability to choose and to re-choose. So if I choose McAfee and they muck up, I can switch to Symantec, or to some open source collaborative effort, or to Microsoft, Google or Apple or whoever else decides to offer such services.> >>>> >>>> >>> The current code is a command line mode tool that only implements catalogs for bookmarks, contacts, passwords, applications, etc. I will be announcing that at HOPE Friday next:> >>>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrBv717w8yY> >>>> >>> The main obstacle to implementing the trust service part of the scheme is that it needs to be built around a browser which was impractical until very recently when Microsoft started shipping WebView2:> >>>> >>> https://github.com/hallambaker/PhillsHypotheticalBrowser> >>>> >>>> >>> The Mesh technology means that I can work from the assumption that every device Alice uses is provisioned with the set of private keys and key shares that enable her to do any cryptographic operation I might need.> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> On Wed, Jul 13, 2022 at 11:08 PM Kathleen Wilson <[email protected]> wrote:> >>>>> >>>> All,> >>>>> >>>> This is just FYI that Mozilla has launched a campaign called "Security Risk Ahead" to provide information about eIDAS article 45.2, which (as currently written) could force browsers to accept QWACs even when they do not fully comply with browser root store requirements.> >>>>> >>>> https://securityriskahead.eu/> >>>>> >>>> Cheers,> >>>> Kathleen> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> --> >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group.> >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].> >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/c10bc945-4b0c-4fcd-b438-98b0e4364f8bn%40mozilla.org.> >> > --> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group.> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].> > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CAMm%2BLwh8n-kRJW2TfWOjLh0EcFh5%3Dr6EViRMm6tNAR4zh4pc4g%40mail.gmail.com.> >> > --> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group.> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].> > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/E1oCJ2z-0003IQ-1T%40submission02.runbox.>> --> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group.> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CAKw1M3NHDsw%2BT1cY5iQCeTJ2d4ukPvFQxkzb%2BmPFPaLLjK3-cw%40mail.gmail.com.
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