I think the key to this issue is "Is the CA should take actions to protect their third-party system security under authorized". This problem included the security of the system, public perception of their morality, and compliance issues. HiCA has used the RCE leak of ACME to add advertising to end users (or commercial activities) but as for now, there are not any security problems that destroy the security of CA reported. A few years ago, Quantum CA used the security leak of CA to issue the certificate which expires a period of 5 years, and now, HiCA used the security leak of ACME to add advertising to end users .
In conclusion, there are things we know: 1. There is not any reported security of CA issues (Sectigo, GTS, and more). 2. HiCA used the RCE leak of ACME but has not caused any security problems (as of now). 3. People think the CA must take action to protect the system security (not only for CA's system) 在2023年6月13日星期二 UTC+8 13:00:45<James Kasten> 写道： > The final reference should be "3. > https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-v2.0.0.pdf"; > instead of the 1.8.7 link provided. (It doesn't change the discussion.) My > apologies. > > James Kasten > Google Trust Services > > On Mon, Jun 12, 2023 at 8:57 PM James Kasten <[email protected]> wrote: > >> To be explicit, GTS does not have a business relationship with HiCA. >> >> Normally ACME services have protections against these types of MitM-CAs, >> but the remote RCE allowed HiCA to bypass these controls [1, 2]. >> >> For instance, it is possible HiCA replaced the local client's key >> authorization during challenge validation with a key authorization provided >> by HiCA, granting authorization of the domain names to HiCA. HiCA could >> theoretically use these authorizations to continue to issue certificates >> for the affected domain names, or revoke the certificates that were issued. >> >> So clients of HiCA should also consider the lasting effects on the the >> domains in addition to your normal recovery procedures for an RCE. It may >> be prudent to reissue and revoke any certificates with your choice of CA >> directly and to watch certificate transparency logs for any future >> unintended issuance. GTS allows authorization reuse up to 28 days on our >> ACME endpoint and issues certificates with lifetimes up to 90 days. Other >> CAs may differ. By the current baseline requirements CAs can issue 398 day >> certificates and reuse the authorizations for 398 days [3]. >> >> >> James Kasten >> Google Trust Services >> >> >> 1. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-6.4 >> 2. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-10.2 >> 3. https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.8.7.pdf >> >> >> On Sunday, June 11, 2023 at 6:34:44 AM UTC-7 Xiaohui Lam wrote: >> >>> No, actually we implementing GTS, SSL.com and sometimes Let's Encrypt, >>> Sectigo all the time. and especially SSL.com issued under SSL.com subCA, >>> not under "Quantum Secure Site DV" acutally. >>> The CA >>> >>> 在2023年6月11日星期日 UTC+8 10:02:14<Amir Omidi (aaomidi)> 写道： >>> >>>> Emailing on my personal capacity: >>>> >>>> Xiaohui, can you please confirm that ssl.com was the only actual CA >>>> that was used for issuance through HiCA? >>>> >>>> On Saturday, June 10, 2023 at 2:08:47 PM UTC-4 Kurt Seifried wrote: >>>> >>>>> Forwarding this to the list, I'm not comfortable with off list >>>>> discussions in private. >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 11:18 AM Xiaohui Lam <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Mr Seifried, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> > Is this really a situation where something extremely suspicious >>>>>> (remote code execution, CA's with multiple entities, some of which don't >>>>>> seem to properly exist, etc.) is going to be swept under the rug with a >>>>>> simple "yeah, we revoked this bad actors certificates, everything is >>>>>> fine"? >>>>>> >>>>>> We are a reseller, not a physical root CA. This is a widely accepted >>>>>> solution for cross border businesses. We have business accepts online >>>>>> payment, the China users needs pay via alipay or wechat, to sign up the >>>>>> merchant we must have a china company, >>>>>> and foreign needs stripe, merchant must be a non-MainlandChina >>>>>> company. this is not suspicious. >>>>>> >>>>>> *. I represent the above opinion of my company >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> > If HiCA can do this, how do we know there are not more >>>>>> intermediate/reseller CAs doing this? >>>>>> >>>>>> Most CA has no necessary to exploiting this RCE, because they can >>>>>> natively >>>>>> compatible with RFC 8555, they can define own CPS and CP, which >>>>>> contains validation policy, we does because we are not CA and can't to >>>>>> provider RFC 8555 ACME endpoint like a CA does. so a physical root CA >>>>>> has >>>>>> no necessary to provide ACME simulation by RCE. and also there're more >>>>>> difficulties for a ssl reseller to provide ACME service which real CAs >>>>>> won't undergo. >>>>>> >>>>>> - CSR stage difference: Most CA's subscriber request process or >>>>>> reseller API process, requires CSR be submitted in the `new-order` API, >>>>>> ACME requires CSR be submitted in `finalize` API. I have a topic in >>>>>> letsencrypt community years ago about this - >>>>>> https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/why-acme-requires-domain-auth-first-before-csr/98482 >>>>>> - Challenge difference: Most CA's subscriber request process or >>>>>> reseller API process's DNS validation requires `_<md5>` / `_dnsauth` >>>>>> dnshost, and dnstype possibly CNAME or possibly TXT, But ACME's DNS >>>>>> validation dnshost is constant: `_acme-challenge`, dnstype `TXT`. And >>>>>> in a >>>>>> more deep talk ACME's dnsvalue needs publickey's thumbprint + server >>>>>> token >>>>>> which is totally different than traditional way's dnsvalue. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> My opinion is community can research how many ACME was publicly >>>>>> provided, and investigate is the provider a physical CA. if is natively >>>>>> compatible with RFC 8555, no worry about that one and continue do >>>>>> investigate >>>>>> next. >>>>>> >>>>>> *. I represent the above opinion of my personal. not my company. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Sincere, >>>>>> Bruce. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> 在2023年6月11日星期日 UTC+8 00:39:16<Kurt Seifried> 写道： >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this really a situation where something extremely suspicious >>>>>> (remote code execution, CA's with multiple entities, some of which don't >>>>>> seem to properly exist, etc.) is going to be swept under the rug with a >>>>>> simple "yeah, we revoked this bad actors certificates, everything is >>>>>> fine"? >>>>>> >>>>>> If HiCA can do this, how do we know there are not more >>>>>> intermediate/reseller CAs doing this? >>>>>> >>>>>> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36252310. >>>>>> >>>>>> Just a note, apparently, websites have been shut down and stuff >>>>>> deleted with respect to HiCA. >>>>>> >>>>>> Posting some of the threads here in case they get removed or whatever: >>>>>> >>>>>> ================== >>>>>> egecks 1 day ago | prev | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> I think the title buries the most horrifying part of this. The HiCA >>>>>> certificate authority is relying on an RCE to do an end-run around the >>>>>> semantics of the ACME HTTP-01 validation method. >>>>>> Fucked up and they should be booted from every root program for this. >>>>>> >>>>>> ================= >>>>>> >>>>>> 0x0 1 day ago | prev | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> Looks like they are issuing under a sub-CA of "ssl.com" according to >>>>>> https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/issues/4659#issue... >>>>>> Interestingly, the mozilla dev-security-policy group seems to contain >>>>>> a recent discussion about including "ssl.com" in the root store here >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-polic... >>>>>> >>>>>> Curious to know if this could, maybe it should, have ripple effects >>>>>> to the various SSL Root CA programs. Having someone run a subCA that >>>>>> actually exploits an RCE against ACME clients doesn't seem very >>>>>> trustworthy, and any CA enabling this behaviour should probably be >>>>>> kicked >>>>>> out of the trust stores? >>>>>> >>>>>> reply >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> agwa 1 day ago | parent | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> The sub CA is operated by ssl.com, not HiCA (which is not a trusted >>>>>> certificate authority). HiCA is relaying the certificate requests to >>>>>> ssl.com, which is properly validating the requests in accordance >>>>>> with all the requirements. ssl.com isn't doing anything wrong. >>>>>> That's why HiCA needs to exploit an RCE in acme.sh - ACME doesn't >>>>>> support >>>>>> relaying certificate requests to other CAs like this. >>>>>> reply >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> 0x0 23 hours ago | root | parent | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> Someone posted a comment on github claiming they are the founder of >>>>>> Quantum (the sub CA of ssl.com - see https://crt.sh/?caid=200960 ) >>>>>> and that they are the provider of the HiCA service. So it does sound >>>>>> like >>>>>> there is a closer link here than your comment would indicate: >>>>>> https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/issues/4659#issue... >>>>>> >>>>>> reply >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> agwa 23 hours ago | root | parent | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> Quantum is not a trusted CA. ssl.com has a white-labeled >>>>>> intermediate CA with the name "Quantum" in it, but this intermediate CA >>>>>> is >>>>>> operated by ssl.com under all the same controls as ssl.com's other >>>>>> intermediate CAs. Quantum has no ability to issue trusted certificates >>>>>> themselves. >>>>>> reply >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> 0x0 23 hours ago | root | parent | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> So the person claiming to be the founder of "QuantumCA" does not >>>>>> possess the private key corresponding to https://crt.sh/?caid=200960 >>>>>> - can we be sure the private key is only accessible by ssl.com's CA >>>>>> system? So the certificates listed here aren't issued by this person, >>>>>> but >>>>>> by the ssl.com's system? >>>>>> https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25&iCAID=200960&exclude=expired&de... >>>>>> Also, why would ssl.com even create a subCA named "QuantumCA"? Are >>>>>> they in business with this person claiming to be the founder of >>>>>> "QuantumCA" >>>>>> who appears to be responsible for exploiting this acme.sh 0day? What >>>>>> does >>>>>> this say about ssl.com's trustworthiness? Or is the person in the >>>>>> github comments lying? >>>>>> >>>>>> reply >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> agwa 23 hours ago | root | parent | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> > So the person claiming to be the founder of "QuantumCA" does not >>>>>> possess the private key corresponding to https://crt.sh/?caid=200960 >>>>>> - can we be sure the private key is only accessible by ssl.com's CA >>>>>> system? So the certificates listed here aren't issued by this person, >>>>>> but >>>>>> by the ssl.com's system? >>>>>> https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25&iCAID=200960&exclude=expired&de... >>>>>> Correct. You can see the Quantum intermediates listed in ssl.com's >>>>>> most recent audit statement, meaning an auditor has verified that >>>>>> ssl.com has controls to protect the private key: >>>>>> https://www.cpacanada.ca/generichandlers/CPACHandler.ashx?at... >>>>>> >>>>>> (The audit could be flawed, but it's the same amount of assurance we >>>>>> have for any intermediate CA's private key - the fact that "QuantumCA" >>>>>> is >>>>>> in the name does not change the risk calculus) >>>>>> >>>>>> > Also, why would ssl.com even create a subCA named "QuantumCA"? Are >>>>>> they in business with this person claiming to be the founder of >>>>>> "QuantumCA" >>>>>> who appears to be responsible for exploiting this acme.sh 0day? What >>>>>> does >>>>>> this say about ssl.com's trustworthiness? Or is the person in the >>>>>> github comments lying? >>>>>> >>>>>> There is a business relationship between QuantumCA and ssl.com. >>>>>> QuantumCA is a reseller of ssl.com, and they've paid extra to ssl.com >>>>>> so that the certificates they purchase get issued from an intermediate >>>>>> CA >>>>>> named "QuantumCA" rather than one of ssl.com's usual intermediate >>>>>> CAs which have "ssl.com" in the name. This lets QuantumCA pretend to >>>>>> be a real CA. This is a common practice in the industry, and I don't >>>>>> think >>>>>> it says anything about the trustworthiness of ssl.com, because the >>>>>> business relationship with QuantumCA doesn't in any way subvert the >>>>>> integrity of the WebPKI since ssl.com retains control of the >>>>>> issuance. Still, I wish intermediate CA white-labeling were banned >>>>>> because >>>>>> it causes terrible confusion about who is and isn't a CA. >>>>>> >>>>>> reply >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> 0x0 23 hours ago | root | parent | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> I find it troubling that a root CA (ssl.com) is apparently OK with >>>>>> lending their name in a business relationship with an actor that is >>>>>> actively exploiting an acme.sh 0day. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> tptacek 20 hours ago | root | parent | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> This feels a little bit like doubling down to find ways to implicate >>>>>> the actual CA instead of the reseller. It's clear how mismanagement by a >>>>>> real CA would make a more interesting story than by this random >>>>>> no-longer-existing pseudo-reseller, but I don't think there's evidence >>>>>> to >>>>>> support that story yet. >>>>>> reply >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> 0x0 20 hours ago | root | parent | next [–] >>>>>> >>>>>> But it's not a random pseudo-reseller? The one github comment from >>>>>> "the founder of Quantum CA" seems to say they are also the creator of >>>>>> HiCA, >>>>>> which is the entity that was exploiting the 0day in acme.sh. And the >>>>>> crt.sh >>>>>> link shows an intermediate CA cert named "QuantumCA", signed by >>>>>> ssl.com. >>>>>> So QuantumCA == HiCA == exploiters of the acme.sh 0day, it's all the >>>>>> same entity? The intermediate CA could just as well be named >>>>>> "0dayexploitersCA"? Why is it not a huge concern that ssl.com is >>>>>> fine with operating such a "0dayexploitersCA" intermediate? >>>>>> >>>>>> Am I missing something here? >>>>>> >>>>>> reply >>>>>> ================= >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Jun 9, 2023 at 1:32 PM Xiaohui Lam <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Mr mochaaP, >>>>>> >>>>>> We're running businesses under multi entities, one is UK company, and >>>>>> one is CN company, the UK company is registered and running by a former >>>>>> workmate which leaved our team, and CN company is registered and running >>>>>> by >>>>>> me. >>>>>> >>>>>> We do stopped from selling SSL.com certificate due to business >>>>>> concern and the cross-sign root expiration concern, That meantime we do >>>>>> have some cooperates with other CAs without whitelabel/intermediateCA, >>>>>> some >>>>>> CAs are directly implemented and some are tier-2 implements(under other >>>>>> resellers). So, our website is kept running, including HiCA keeps. >>>>>> >>>>>> But we will stop all misleading business to stop provide our Quantum >>>>>> brand products, only contain our China company's materials. >>>>>> >>>>>> My KEY OPINION: our China entity has been kept in existence so we >>>>>> kept the reselling business. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sincere. >>>>>> Bruce Lam >>>>>> 在2023年6月10日星期六 UTC+8 03:13:11<mochaaP> 写道： >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Xiaohui, >>>>>> >>>>>> I think you may have misunderstood my message. What I meant to convey >>>>>> was that I am skeptical of your intention to resell your own CA for a >>>>>> dissolved Ltd. that was not subject to having its certificate revoked. >>>>>> We >>>>>> believe that this practice is uncommon for a reseller in such a case. >>>>>> >>>>>> Please understand that my message was not intended to be hateful >>>>>> towards you or your team. If you believe that this was an honest >>>>>> mistake, >>>>>> please reply to this thread with more details. The community values >>>>>> transparency and trust, and we would be happy to hear your perspective. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best regards, >>>>>> Zephyr Lykos >>>>>> On Saturday, June 10, 2023 at 1:08:08 AM UTC+8 Xiaohui Lam wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks John to share this topic to the dev-security forum. >>>>>> >>>>>> This is HiCA founder, let me to explain your concern, Mr John , >>>>>> the RCE is fully used to finish the challenge which validated by CAs, >>>>>> in another word, the ACME.sh-enrolled certificates which passing this >>>>>> RCE, >>>>>> it does compliant with each CA's BR validation requirements. CA did >>>>>> nothing >>>>>> wrong. And also by this trick can enroll any CA's certificate before >>>>>> acme.sh fix patch. >>>>>> >>>>>> and to Mr @mochaaP, you said to punish our team, we're NOT a public >>>>>> CA or private CA(in my understanding, a CA must manage a or more PKI >>>>>> infrastructure physically), [3]so the clarify relationship to HiCA w/ >>>>>> QuantumCA is no necessary, but we still told we runs HiCA inside >>>>>> QuantumCA >>>>>> project's source code, it's a sub-application inside it. >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree @Andrew's opinion, CAs shouldn't take any responsibilities to >>>>>> the RCE incidents. or there are hundreds acme-tools for CAs need to >>>>>> concern. >>>>>> 在2023年6月10日星期六 UTC+8 00:43:47<mochaaP> 写道： >>>>>> >>>>>> Hello, >>>>>> >>>>>> Although HiCA is not a CA itself, the person own HiCA seems also owns >>>>>> (or at least works for) Quantum CA[1][2]. they also confirmed that >>>>>> Quantum >>>>>> CA is operated by both their team and SSL.com team[3]. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think this probably is not as simple as a white-label intermediate >>>>>> CA being abused, rather a CA that resells their own product to >>>>>> themselves >>>>>> to prevent being punished for bad behaviors. >>>>>> >>>>>> [1]: https://github.com/xiaohuilam (see "Pinned" section) >>>>>> [2]: https://github.com/quantumca (see "People" section) >>>>>> [3]: >>>>>> https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/issues/4659#issuecomment-1584546150 >>>>>> >>>>>> (note that this person never clearified their relationship with Quantum >>>>>> CA >>>>>> and only replied with "So this isn't the evidence to proof HiCA is a CA >>>>>> which managed PKI.") >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> Zephyr Lykos >>>>>> >>>>>> On Friday, June 9, 2023 at 9:04:34 PM UTC+8 Andrew Ayer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, 9 Jun 2023 05:42:22 -0700 (PDT) >>>>>> "John Han (hanyuwei70)" <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > Here is the story. >>>>>> > https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/issues/4659 >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Seems like they exploited acme.sh and let user to evade certificate >>>>>> > issuing procedure. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Do we need to discuss this? >>>>>> >>>>>> The party in question (HiCA/QuantumCA) is not a certificate >>>>>> authority, >>>>>> and I don't see any evidence that the actual CAs in question evaded >>>>>> any >>>>>> validation requirements. >>>>>> >>>>>> HiCA/QuantumCA is just acting as an intermediary between subscribers >>>>>> and the issuance APIs operated by actual CAs[1]. Literally anyone can >>>>>> do this and do monumentally stupid/insecure things; it's not >>>>>> productive >>>>>> to have a discussion every time this happens. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> Andrew >>>>>> >>>>>> [1] It's true they have a reseller relationship with ssl.com, who >>>>>> are >>>>>> operating a white-label intermediate CA with "QuantumCA" in the >>>>>> subject, but HiCA/QuantnumCA are also fronting other CAs, including >>>>>> GTS, which doesn't require a reseller agreement to access their free >>>>>> ACME API, so I don't see that aspect as being productive to discuss >>>>>> either. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "[email protected]" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/0f9174b3-02d6-4ff6-a7fa-3b931375076dn%40mozilla.org >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/0f9174b3-02d6-4ff6-a7fa-3b931375076dn%40mozilla.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Kurt Seifried (He/Him) >>>>>> [email protected] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Kurt Seifried (He/Him) >>>>> [email protected] >>>>> >>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group. 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