Could we add a section for geographical incidents? This is slightly
outside your time window, but I think reading the series here has some
uncanny echos in the ones in your window.

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1658792
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1658794
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1802916
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1804753
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1867130

On Tue, May 7, 2024 at 7:59 AM 'Ben Wilson' via
dev-security-policy@mozilla.org <dev-security-policy@mozilla.org>
wrote:
>
> Dear Mozilla Community,
>
> Over the past couple of months, a substantial number of compliance incidents 
> have arisen in relation to Entrust. We have summarized these recent incidents 
> in a dedicated wiki page: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Entrust_Issues. In 
> brief, these incidents arose out of certificate mis-issuance due to a 
> misunderstanding of the EV Guidelines, followed by numerous mistakes in 
> incident handling (including a deliberate decision to continue mis-issuance), 
> which have been compounded by a failure to remediate the issues in a timely 
> fashion in line with well-established norms and root store requirements.
>
> Our preliminary assessment of these incidents is that while they were 
> relatively minor initially, the poor incident response has substantially 
> aggravated them and the progress towards full remediation remains 
> unacceptably slow. This is particularly disappointing in light of previous 
> incidents in 2020 (#1651481 and #1648472), which arose out of similar 
> misunderstandings of the requirements, similar poor decision-making in the 
> initial response, and lengthy remediation periods that fell well below 
> expectations. Entrust gave commitments in those bugs to address the root 
> problems through process improvements, and it is concerning to see so little 
> improvement 4 years later.
>
> In light of these recent incidents, we are requesting that Entrust produce a 
> detailed report of them. This report should cover in detail:
>
> The factors and root causes that lead to the initial incidents, highlighting 
> commonalities among the incidents and any systemic failures;
>
> Entrust’s initial incident handling and decision-making in response to these 
> incidents, including any internal policies or protocols used by Entrust to 
> guide their response and an evaluation of whether their decisions and overall 
> response complied with Entrust’s policies, their practice statement, and the 
> requirements of the Mozilla Root Program;
>
> A detailed timeline of the remediation process and an apportionment of delays 
> to root causes; and
>
> An evaluation of how these recent issues compare to the historical issues 
> referenced above and Entrust’s compliance with its previously stated 
> commitments.
>
> Finally, Entrust’s report should include a detailed proposal on how it plans 
> to address the root causes of these issues. In light of previous guarantees 
> given by Entrust in 2020 to ensure speedy remediation in future incidents, 
> this proposal should include:
>
> Clear and concrete steps that Entrust proposes to take to address the root 
> causes of these incidents and delayed remediation;
>
> Measurable and objective criteria for Mozilla and the community to evaluate 
> Entrust’s progress in deploying these solutions; and
>
> A timeline for which Entrust will commit to meeting these criteria.
>
> We strongly recommend that Entrust go beyond their existing commitment to 
> offer systematic, automated solutions for effective remediation, like ACME 
> ARI and that it also include clear and measurable targets for the adoption of 
> these tools by new and existing subscribers.
>
> This report should be submitted to Mozilla dev-security-policy mailing list 
> for evaluation by the community and Mozilla, who will weigh whether Entrust’s 
> report presents a credible and effective path towards re-establishing trust 
> in Entrust’s operation. Submission should be no later than June 7, 2024.
>
> We thank community members for their engagement on these issues and look 
> forward to their feedback on Entrust’s report and proposed commitments.
>
>  Thanks,
>
> Ben Wilson
>
> Mozilla Root Program
>
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