Hello, Alvin Wang, Acorrding to ihuandu's article(now deleted), they have a IP ssl demonstration purposes: https://113.10.156.232. I found there are three certificates matches this hostname and issued by KeepTrust OV TLS RSA CA G1 https://crt.sh/?Identity=113.10.156.232&iCAID=299739: - https://crt.sh/?id=12806661692 - https://crt.sh/?id=12813257892 - https://crt.sh/?id=12807160321
Plesase disclosure the particulars how SHECA did perform domain(IP) control validation for 113.10.156.232? If you can provide the verification server logs would be more convincing to the community. Thank you. On Sunday, June 23, 2024 at 1:33:21 AM UTC+8 Alvin Wang wrote: > On behalf of SHECA, I am responding to the points that need clarification > in this discussion. > > Thank you, Aaron Gable, for your attention. SHECA immediately reviewed our > CPS content after seeing your comment. The latest CPS from SHECA can be > found at: > https://assets-cdn.sheca.com/documents/sheca-certification-practice-statement-en-v3.6.3.pdf > . > > In the CPS, section 3.2.6 describes the rules for IP address verification: > > - 1.Section 3.2.6 does not state the use of BR 3.2.2.5.4 for IP > verification because this method was prohibited on July 31, 2019. > - 2.The section describes SHECA's IP verification methods, where the > second item (1) and (2) corresponds to BR 3.2.2.5.1, and (3) corresponds > to > BR 3.2.2.5.3. > > > Huandu is SHECA's distributor (agent) and does not have any authority or > responsibility to issue or verify SSL certificates. SHECA's SSL certificate > issuance process strictly adheres to BR regulations. > All external disclosures regarding SSL certificate verification rules must > be conducted through SHECA's CPS, with no other disclosure channels. Huandu > published an inaccurate marketing article without SHECA's consent, > and we have urgently contacted Huandu to address this issue. > > *We hope this clarifies your concerns!* > > On Saturday, June 22, 2024 at 12:59:29 AM UTC+8 Aaron Gable wrote: > >> The BRs define an Authorized Port as "One of the following ports: 80 >> (http), 443 (https), 25 (smtp), 22 (ssh)". >> >> The UCA Global G2 Root is operated by SHECA, and their CPS >> <https://www.sheca.com/repository> says that they use method 3.2.2.5.1, >> as well as potentially method 3.2.2.5.4. (It also lists two other methods, >> labeled (2) and (3), which do not appear to correspond to BRs-approved >> methods.) >> >> The BRs say that IP address validation method 3.2.2.5.1 "Agreed-Upon >> Change to Website" must occur "via HTTP/HTTPS over an Authorized Port". It >> is unclear to me whether using HTTP/HTTPS over port 25 or 22 would be >> acceptable given the parenthetical nature of the protocol annotations, even >> setting aside the technical hurdle of actually doing so. >> >> If we assume that using HTTP/HTTPS over port 25 or 22 is allowed, then I >> believe the claim in the linked article could be both accurate and >> acceptable by the BRs. >> If we assume that using HTTP/HTTPS over port 25 or 22 is not allowed, or >> if the actual validation conducted by Huandu on behalf of SHECA occurs over >> a different port, then I believe the article's claim would not be >> acceptable by the BRs. >> >> Aaron >> >> On Fri, Jun 21, 2024 at 8:33 AM Arabella Barks <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> I recently find a Chinese ssl reseller ihuandu.com says they provide a >>> ssl product which secures ip address and needn't 80/443 DCV. >>> >>> > The SSL certificate does not need to force the use of port 80 or 443 >>> to verify the public IP management permission, and has a more flexible >>> authentication port to help users obtain the SSL certificate of the public >>> IP in a relatively short time. >>> >>> https://www.ihuandu.com/pr/hddt/771.html >>> >>> Does it compliant BR? >>> The BR defines: >>> > 3.2.2.5 Authentication for an IP Address >>> > This section defines the permitted processes and procedures for >>> validating the Applicant’s ownership or control of an IP Address listed in >>> a Certificate. The CA SHALL confirm that prior to issuance, the CA has >>> validated each IP Address listed in the Certificate using at least one of >>> the methods specified in this section. Completed validations of Applicant >>> authority may be valid for the issuance of multiple Certificates over time. >>> In all cases, the validation must have been initiated within the time >>> period specified in the relevant requirement (such as Section 4.2.1 of this >>> document) prior to Certificate issuance. For purposes of IP Address >>> validation, the term Applicant includes the Applicant’s Parent Company, >>> Subsidiary Company, or Affiliate. After July 31, 2019, CAs SHALL maintain a >>> record of which IP validation method, including the relevant BR version >>> number, was used to validate every IP Address. >>> > >>> > 3.2.2.5.1 >>> > Agreed‑Upon Change to Website >>> > Confirming the Applicant’s control over the requested IP Address by >>> confirming the presence of a Request Token or Random Value contained in the >>> content of a file or webpage in the form of a meta tag under the >>> “/.well‐known/pki‐validation” directory, or another path registered with >>> IANA for the purpose of validating control of IP Addresses, on the IP >>> Address that is accessible by the CA via HTTP/HTTPS over an Authorized >>> Port. The Request Token or Random Value MUST NOT appear in the request. If >>> a Random Value is used, the CA SHALL provide a Random Value unique to the >>> certificate request and SHALL not use the Random Value after the longer of >>> i. 30 days or ii. if the Applicant submitted the certificate request, the >>> time frame permitted for reuse of validated information relevant to the >>> certificate (such as in Section 4.2.1 of this document). >>> > >>> > 3.2.2.5.2 >>> > Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to IP Address Contact >>> > Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by sending a >>> Random Value via email, fax, SMS, or postal mail and then receiving a >>> confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value MUST be >>> sent to an email address, fax/SMS number, or postal mail address identified >>> as an IP Address Contact. Each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail MAY confirm >>> control of multiple IP Addresses. The CA MAY send the email, fax, SMS, or >>> postal mail identified under this section to more than one recipient >>> provided that every recipient is identified by the IP Address Registration >>> Authority as representing the IP Address Contact for every IP Address being >>> verified using the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail. The Random Value SHALL >>> be unique in each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail. The CA MAY resend the >>> email, fax, SMS, or postal mail in its entirety, including re‐use of the >>> Random Value, provided that the communication’s entire contents and >>> recipient(s) remain unchanged. The Random Value SHALL remain valid for use >>> in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation. The >>> CPS MAY specify a shorter validity period for Random Values, in which case >>> the CA MUST follow its CPS. pg. 36 >>> > >>> > 3.2.2.5.3 Reverse Address Lookup >>> > Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by obtaining a >>> Domain Name associated with the IP Address through a reverse‐IP lookup on >>> the IP Address and then verifying control over the FQDN using a method >>> permitted under Section 3.2.2.4. >>> > >>> > 3.2.2.5.4 >>> > Any Other Method >>> > Using any other method of confirmation, including variations of the >>> methods defined in Section 3.2.2.5, provided that the CA maintains >>> documented evidence that the method of confirmation establishes that the >>> Applicant has control over the IP Address to at least the same level of >>> assurance as the methods previously described in version 1.6.2 of these >>> Requirements. CAs SHALL NOT perform validations using this method after >>> July 31, 2019. Completed validations using this method SHALL NOT be re‐used >>> for certificate issuance after July 31, 2019. Any certificate issued prior >>> to August 1, 2019 containing an IP Address that was validated using any >>> method that was permitted under the prior version of this Section 3.2.2.5 >>> MAY continue to be used without revalidation until such certificate >>> naturally expires. 3.2.2.5.5 Phone Contact with IP Address Contact >>> Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by calling the IP >>> Address Contact’s phone number and obtaining a response confirming the >>> Applicant’s request for validation of the IP Address. The CA MUST place the >>> call to a phone number identified by the IP Address Registration Authority >>> as the IP Address Contact. Each phone call SHALL be made to a single >>> number. In the event that someone other than an IP Address Contact is >>> reached, the CA MAY request to be transferred to the IP Address Contact. In >>> the event of reaching voicemail, the CA may leave the Random Value and the >>> IP Address(es) being validated. The Random Value MUST be returned to the CA >>> to approve the request. The Random Value SHALL remain valid for use in a >>> confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation. The CPS MAY >>> specify a shorter validity period for Random Values. >>> > >>> > 3.2.2.5.6 ACME “http‑01” method for IP Addresses >>> > Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by performing >>> the procedure documented for an “http‐01” challenge in RFC 8738. >>> > >>> > 3.2.2.5.7 ACME “tls‑alpn‑01” method for IP Addresses >>> > Confirming the Applicant’s control over the IP Address by performing >>> the procedure documented for a “tls‐alpn‐01” challenge in RFC 8738. >>> >>> And I am curious much about Does it compliant BR(which method are they >>> requiring)? >>> and how they conduct reviews to ensure that the IP website identity is >>> not being misused? >>> >>> Root CA: >>> CN = UCA Global G2 Root >>> O = UniTrust >>> C = CN >>> >>> Intermedia CA: >>> CN = KeepTrust OV TLS RSA CA G1 >>> O = Shanghai Huandu Info Tech Co. Ltd. >>> C = CN >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "[email protected]" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/8f7dfd56-20dc-4a9f-bea2-1137d9289255n%40mozilla.org >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/8f7dfd56-20dc-4a9f-bea2-1137d9289255n%40mozilla.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/30296019-e9b0-4f32-aac3-16597ca4e399n%40mozilla.org.
