All,

Here for comment is a first draft of a proposal to phase-out multi-purpose
root CA certificates. This is tied to GitHub Issue #279
<https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/279>, referenced in the
subject line above.

This proposal is that a new Section 7.5 be added to the Mozilla Root Store
Policy (MRSP). Other conforming changes would be made elsewhere in the MRSP
to remove any implication that a root CA certificate could have both the
websites trust bit and the email-protection trust bit after January 1, 2027.

Please provide any comments or suggestions you might have to improve or
change this proposal.

Thanks,

Ben


*7.5 Dedicated Root Certificates*

Effective immediately, all root CA certificates being considered for
inclusion in Mozilla's Root Store MUST be dedicated either to TLS server
authentication or to S/MIME email protection. Existing root CA certificates
that do not comply with this requirement MUST be replaced or transition to
a dedicated hierarchy prior to January 1, 2027.

*7.5.1 TLS Server Authentication Roots*

Root CA certificates dedicated to TLS server authentication with the
websites trust bit enabled MUST meet the following criteria:

   1. All subordinate CA certificates MUST:
      - Include the extendedKeyUsage extension and assert only:
         - id-kp-serverAuth; or
         - Both id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth.
      - Not share a public key with any certificate that asserts a
      different extendedKeyUsage value.
   2. All end-entity certificates issued MUST:
      - Include the extendedKeyUsage extension and assert only:
         - id-kp-serverAuth; or
         - Both id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth.

*7.5.2 S/MIME Roots*

Root CA certificates dedicated to S/MIME with the email protection trust
bit enabled MUST meet the following criteria:

   1. All subordinate CA certificates MUST:
      - Include the extendedKeyUsage extension and assert only:
         - id-kp-emailProtection; or
         - Both id-kp-emailProtection and id-kp-clientAuth.
      - Not share a public key with any certificate that asserts a
      different extendedKeyUsage value.
   2. All end-entity certificates issued MUST:
      - Include the extendedKeyUsage extension and assert only:
         - id-kp-emailProtection; or
         - Both id-kp-emailProtection and id-kp-clientAuth.

*7.5.3 Transition Plan for Existing Multi-Purpose Roots*

Root CA certificates included in Mozilla's Root Store as of January 1,
2025, with both the websites and the email trust bits enabled, MAY continue
to be trusted after January 1, 2026, if by such date the CA operator has
submitted a transition plan that demonstrates a feasible migration to a
dedicated hierarchy that will be completed prior to January 1, 2027.

Transition plans MUST address the following:

   1. Existing submissions of requests for inclusion of new single-purpose
   roots;
   2. Requests to remove the websites trust bit or the email trust bit from
   a multi-purpose root; and
   3. Timelines for phasing out multiple uses of the root--dates by which
   certificates that do not meet the requirements of Sections 7.5.1 or 7.5.2
   will be revoked, expire, be replaced, or for which issuance will cease.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"[email protected]" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion visit 
https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CA%2B1gtaYWFREw%2B0KOU61bVgjZXxHZuvQyXmQDSbMgMZqVk18FTQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Reply via email to