Boris Zbarsky wrote:
Given 4 levels of infrastructure, there could be either more or fewer
than 4 levels in the UI. As a dumb example, the UI could have two
levels: "safe" and "not safe", where "safe" would be level 3 or 4
certificates that you've bookmarked before or level 2 certificates that
you've explicitly decided are safe in an earlier browsing session. That
sort of thing.
But the more levels we have, the more work it is for us and the CAs to
classify certificates and products. If this distinction is not reflected
in the UI, that work is wasted.
Add in the fact that different Gecko embeddors might want to make
different decisions about how to work the UI, and having a fine-grained
certificate infrastructure starts to look like a pretty good idea.
I think there's a strong level of absolutism here. That is to say, if a
certain level of vetting is sufficient for a web shop, then it's
sufficient. The level below doesn't magically become sufficient just
because someone else is distributing the browser.
For example, my mother is considering using her credit card at a
shop, and the UI indicates (in some way) that it is level 2 secured.
The UI is broken and should be fixed, since "level 2" means absolutely
nothing to your mother.
Yes, of course. But isn't it obvious what I meant? Let me be more
long-winded:
For example, my mother is considering using her credit card at a
shop, and the UI presents all those indicators consistent with a level 2
certificate, and none of those consistent with a level 3 certificate.
What message is she supposed to get?
Or to put it another way, if I'm a shop, can I get a level 2 certificate
and be fairly sure that browsers won't discourage people from shopping
with me? Or do I need a level 3?
Gerv
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