On Jan 12, 5:53 am, Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote:
> not all end-users have to use it for it to be helpful in the case of a
> particular site which is using it. I say this because once the site
> owner is warned of the problem, he can fix it. If no-one has CSP, it may
> take much longer for people to notice the compromise.

Of course, unless the site breaks in a noticeable way when violations
of CSP occur, there is no additional help for the site developer...
and I don't believe that CSP is intended to have a violation reporting
mechanism.  Additionally, it is my impression that a lot of attacks
stopped by CSP would break un-noticed.  For example, a cross-site
exploit that simply embeds a <script> and steals cookies would likely
not modify the page visually, so whether or not it fails, the end-user
wouldn't notice.

Maybe something to add value to CSP support would be a CSP developer
mode or warning logo somewhere in the browser that alerts the end-user
when a policy is violated.  That would indeed be an easy-addon, and
perhaps testers could just flip it on for sites they fool with on a
daily basis.

Or do we want phone-home features for CSP so the browser will
automatically tell a site when its policy is violated?  This sounds
like it could be abused to help sites identify which browsers support
CSP (essentially providing that 'this-browser-supports-csp' flag
you're arguing against).

-Sid
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