> Background apps will have to go through a separate notifications API > in order to frob the vibrator.
And for those, a UI mechanism for determining which app is causing the vibration would be useful. -dev On 16 April 2012 00:05, Justin Lebar <[email protected]> wrote: > > So far the only feedback I have received is that it would be good to > have a UI mechanism for determine which app is triggering the vibration, > which sounds like a reasonable idea to me. Thanks! > > Only foreground pages / apps can trigger vibrations via the vibrator > API. So there is no need to expose in the UI which app is responsible > for a vibration. > > Background apps will have to go through a separate notifications API > in order to frob the vibrator. > > On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 3:55 PM, Lucas Adamski <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Last call for comments! So far the only feedback I have received is > that it would be good to have a UI mechanism for determine which app is > triggering the vibration, which sounds like a reasonable idea to me. > Thanks! > > Lucas. > > > > On Apr 11, 2012, at 10:36 PM, Lucas Adamski wrote: > > > >> Name of API: Vibration > >> Reference: http://dev.w3.org/2009/dap/vibration/ > >> > >> Brief purpose of API: Let content activate the vibration motor > >> > >> Inherent threats: Obnoxious if mis-used, consume extra battery > >> Threat severity: low > >> > >> == Regular web content (unauthenticated) == > >> Use cases for unauthenticated code: Vibrate when hit in a game > >> Authorization model for uninstalled web content: Explicit > >> Authorization model for installed web content: Implicit > >> Potential mitigations: Limit how long vibrations can run > >> > >> == Trusted (authenticated by publisher) == > >> Use cases for authenticated code:[Same] > >> Authorization model: Implicit > >> Potential mitigations: > >> > >> == Certified (vouched for by trusted 3rd party) == > >> Use cases for certified code: > >> Authorization model: implicit > >> Potential mitigations: > >> > >> Notes: This API may be implicitly granted. User can deny from > Permission Manager to over-ride an abusive app. > >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > > dev-b2g mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-b2g > _______________________________________________ > dev-security mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security > _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security
