On 13/08/13 18:11, ianG wrote: > Badly. Riddled with bad, false and self-serving assumptions. here's > just one: > > "Before we begin, we must understand that > Security = Encryption * Authentication." > > Wrong. That happens to be the SSLv2 security offering, aka C.I.A. for > confidentiality, integrity, authenticity. That model has only the > vaguest relationship to the security of the users. Even the inventors > of SSLv2 don't hold onto that position with any seriousness any more.
[Perhaps you don't mean to, but you do have a habit of writing your points in a way which takes 3x as much effort to parse and understand as other people's, often due to your assuming too much shared knowledge. This provides a disincentive to engage with your argument.] Without citations and further elaboration, there is nothing above that can be interacted with. > Even the browsers don't implement that model, because they famously do > not state to the user who is authenticating what. Substitutions without > notice are part of the architecture. Yep. And that's just fine. Users do not want to figure out which of 60 CAs they trust; they'd rather delegate that job to Mozilla. And we take it seriously. If we say FooCA is OK to do authentication, then (for our users) it's OK - and if they turn out not to be OK, we give them the boot. This doesn't seem to me to be an argument against "Security = Encryption * Authentication". The point of that phrase is "Zero encryption => zero security", "zero authentication of the endpoint => zero security". Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security
