I don't buy it. Processes are heavy enough, especially on mobile
devices, that Chrome pragmatically limits the number in the pool and
shares non-HTTPS (last I heard, someone correct me if this has changed
materially).
Process per iframe? How about per img?
Software isolation via the MMU is good, I like it. It's not the only way
to crashproof, though. NaCl for SFI was originally designed to work
in-process, and managed code VMs/runtimes can isolate at finer grain.
Good point about expanded principals. I'm not sure of the b2g details
(will ask around and report back) but I've proposed that cross-site
scripts (script src="http://ads-r-us.com/...") should be given a
distinct trust label that's subordinate in the lattice to the including
page's origin-label.
/be
Boris Zbarsky wrote:
See
http://lists.whatwg.org/htdig.cgi/whatwg-whatwg.org/2013-January/038666.html
Not sure whether we think that's a good idea, but if we do, we should
design it in...
Note that this raises interesting questions with things like expanded
principals and all the various other stuff b2g has been doing that
allows some limited cross-origin access. WebKit never allows that
sort of thing, so they don't have that problem. We should really talk
to the b2g folks to find out what they really need here.
-Boris
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