I don't buy it. Processes are heavy enough, especially on mobile devices, that Chrome pragmatically limits the number in the pool and shares non-HTTPS (last I heard, someone correct me if this has changed materially).

Process per iframe? How about per img?

Software isolation via the MMU is good, I like it. It's not the only way to crashproof, though. NaCl for SFI was originally designed to work in-process, and managed code VMs/runtimes can isolate at finer grain.

Good point about expanded principals. I'm not sure of the b2g details (will ask around and report back) but I've proposed that cross-site scripts (script src="http://ads-r-us.com/...";) should be given a distinct trust label that's subordinate in the lattice to the including page's origin-label.

/be

Boris Zbarsky wrote:
See http://lists.whatwg.org/htdig.cgi/whatwg-whatwg.org/2013-January/038666.html

Not sure whether we think that's a good idea, but if we do, we should design it in...

Note that this raises interesting questions with things like expanded principals and all the various other stuff b2g has been doing that allows some limited cross-origin access. WebKit never allows that sort of thing, so they don't have that problem. We should really talk to the b2g folks to find out what they really need here.

-Boris
_______________________________________________
dev-servo mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-servo
_______________________________________________
dev-servo mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-servo

Reply via email to