Kathleen Wilson and I have been discussing how to re-start the 
evaluation process for T-Systems. If you recall, that request (bug 
378882) got bogged down in a discussion of how to deal with situations 
where the root CA doesn't actually issue end entity certificates and the 
root CA's CPS doesn't address issuance of EE certs, but instead all the 
EE certs are issued by third-party subordinates.

Kathleen thinks, and I agree, that the best way to approach this both 
with T-Systems and with other CAs in general is to ask the CA to update 
the CP/CPS for the root to include language addressing the following:

* Clear requirements for subordinate CAs for how information in 
end-entity certs is to be verified, such that section 7 of the Mozilla 
CA policy (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/) is 
satisfied.

* Requirements for subordinate CAs in regards to whether or not
subordinate CAs are constrained to issue certificates only within
certain domains, and whether or not subordinate CAs can create their
own subordinates.

* Audit requirements for subordinate CAs with regard to the frequency of 
audits and who can/should perform them, as per sections 8, 9, and 10 of 
the Mozilla CA policy.

Our goal here is to avoid having to evaluate lots and lots of 
subordinate CAs, and instead have the roots take care of their own 
subordinates and ensure they're compliant to policy.

Does this sound reasonable? If so we'll proceed as noted above.

Frank

P.S. One thing I asked for before at some point, and I'll re-ask now, is 
a clear brief technical description on how root CAs would constrain 
subordinates to issue EE certs only within certain domains, and also 
prevent them from creating their own subordinates. I'd like to add this to

https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Recommendations_for_Roots

to provide some technical background for anyone interested.

-- 
Frank Hecker
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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