One of the things that is a little bit variable in the way the
software presents to the user is the presentation of the
information.  Specifically, when dealing with certs, we expect the
cert to make a claim of some form, and we expect the relying party
to be somewhat OK with that claim.

What do people think should be the claim made by software?  From a
table I have, there are several possibilities:

Thunderbird:  "Certificate issued by: CN"
Firefox:      "Verified by: O"
Safari:       "Issued by: CN"
Konqueror:    no claim apparently made, but CN chain is displayed

(I don't have all of them above, please fill out the rest, if you
have access to these tools.  I've probably got some of them wrong,
but that's not the issue today.)

There are two big qustions surfacing out of the above:

1.  Should the CN or the O be the name displayed for the CA?

2.  Looking at Firefox, there is a claim that the cert was
*verified* by the named CA.  Most of the others just say that the
certificate was *issued* by the CA.

There is a pretty big difference between these positions.  The
Firefox position creates an effective legal claim that the CA has
indeed verified the information presented;  the others defer that
issue to "somewhere else" and make only a strict rendering of the
crypto results.



Personally, I quite like the claim that Firefox makes.  It would be
nice for the user to have *some* view as to what all this stuff is
about, and right now they get precious little help from participants
in any form of clarity.  Firefox helps in this way by providing
something pretty simple.  The others pass the buck.

OTOH, we might not all agree with the claim that Firefox makes;  we
may think there is some merit in issuing certs which include
unverified information.  Or that the user is told nothing about the
claim by the software.  In which case, Firefox is out on a limb,
legally, and a bug should be filed to bring it back to a safe claims
position.

The point though is that we should really have a unified position on
this, and we should write down the actual situation (as this should
in effect become a criteria for audit as well as a commitment by the
parties).

What do people think?

iang

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