Ian G wrote:
>That wasn't my question.  Here's my question again:  How do you show any 
>person afterwards that the person signed it?

>I mean: how does Alice look tomorrow in this system to see what she 
>signed?  Next year?  How does Bob look next year to see what Alice 
>signed?  How does Trent, some random third party like a judge?

This is a very valid question and probably you will find my answer pretty
insufficient, but WASP was deliberately designed for service-providers
who want to automate and improve credibility of exiting systems, not creating
a new fancy tool for "emulating" contract writing in the physical world.
The latter represents a technical and legal challenge I'm not ready for :-)

Converted to practical terms that means that the service provider is asking
you to grant something, and then it should in some way provide you with a
receipt that depending on the actual use-case may contain not only the original
"document", but additional details such as when it was received.  A patent 
filing
application would fit this description, while an in-house purchasing application
would not since such systems keep all data available on-line for any authorized
user to view like existing purchase operations.

Saving a signed document locally would not really make much of a difference
since you technically can create arbitrary off-line data and sign it.  If you 
OTOH
required that requests are signed by service-providers it would more sense (at
least legally) since then you could prove what you where requested to sign which
I believe was the primary objection to what I'm currently implementing.

However, trying to squeeze in "peer" signature scenarios would IMO be dumb;
such a scheme needs to be designed from the ground and up!  Patent-filing,
in-house purchasing, and tax declarations are not really "peer" scenarios, 
because the
associated service providers set all the rules.  WASP adheres to this 
unilateral notion :-)

Anders

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