On Feb 22, 5:11 pm, makrober <[email protected]> wrote: > > ...Every existing CA [...] made a promise to comply to the universal PKI > > trust policy, we just need a scheme to enforce their promise. > > If we need a scheme to enforce some TTP's promise of uncorruptibility, he > evidently does not qualify as a Trusted Third Party. Why are you thinking so absolute in the world of cryptography?
> This does not mean that the certificate verification mechanics are at fault; > it only means that CA selection protocol has not been thought out properly: > it limped along with a handful of CAs, it is showing the serious symptoms > of the malaise with hundreds. In the meantime, does anybody here have any > estimate of the number of CAs we expect to be around in the foreseeable > future? And what was the number of CAs anticipated when the current > anointment protocol was conceived? > If the above is correct - and I just don't think how one could argue > otherwise - the ONLY solution is to put the selection of TTPs back into > the hands of communicating parties. And not as an option, but as a default. I agree with you that you should revive the CA selection protocol, but we should also add 01 Auditing layer above of it anyway, it's an independent problem. > Otherwise (as it was correctly observed in one of the previous messages), > we can add layers upon layers of "watcher watchers" without ever addressing > the fundamental problem. We don't need and don't want (near) absolute security, one auditing layer is reliable enough. Have you considered my argument of the financial report and the auditor? Even the most prestigious public company need one layer auditor, but one is enough for general use, not countless layers upon layers. Of course there is still layers of law above all of them. -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
