On 5/20/2010 7:20 PM, Matt McCutchen wrote: > When > "security.ssl.allow_unrestricted_renego_everywhere__temporarily_available_pref" > is off, Firefox will refuse to perform a server-initiated > renegotiation with a non-RFC-5746 server. What is the purpose of this > behavior? It doesn't mitigate the vulnerability because in the attack > scenario, the client believes it is performing an initial > negotiation.
If the client goes ahead and completes the handshake, sending his client cert and/or cookies, he may be giving those authentication credentials to the bad guy's malicious request being buffered at the server. So even though (in this attack scenario) it's the server that sees the renegotiation, the client and server both have an equal interest in ensuring the security of the connection. - Marsh -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
