On 09/08/13 18:12, Brian Smith wrote: > No, each combination is hard-coded into its own distinct code point that is > registered with IANA: > https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4. > This is a design choice based on the fact that many crypto modules don't > let you mix/match algorithms at will, and because you often can't/shouldn't > move keys between crypto modules.
OK. So you are choosing from a fixed palette, and changing that palette is outside the scope of this proposal? > There is a difference between leaking to somebody on the network and > leaking to the server you are connecting to. Remember that TLS hides the > User-Agent string and other HTTP-level information is hidden from others on > the network. So, if Firefox for Android and Firefox for Desktop use the > exact same TLS handshaking logic/parameters, then it should be possible to > make them indistinguishable from each other. I agree this is theoretically possible but, as Tom points out, if we posit an attacker who can see your traffic, the chances of you concealing the identity of your user agent from him are pretty small. When risk is there to a user of having a network eavesdropper able to tell that they are using a particular browser? If I had an exploit for a particular browser, I'd just try it anyway and see if it worked. That seems to be the normal pattern. >> * Re: Camellia and SEED: we should talk to the organisations which >> pushed for their addition, and our business development people in the >> region, before eliminating them. (This is not to say that we will >> definitely not remove them if they raise objections.) > > Do you have suggestions for who to contact? The first person I would talk to would be Gen Kanai <g...@mozilla.com>, although he may put you in touch with others. Gerv -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
